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Abstract
This thesis investigates the development of early cognition in infancy using neural
network models. Fundamental events in visual perception such as caused motion,
occlusion, object permanence, tracking of moving objects behind occluders, object
unity perception and sequence learning are modeled in a unifying computational
framework while staying close to experimental data in developmental psychology
of infancy.
In the rst project, the development of causality and occlusion perception in in-
fancy is modeled using a simple, three-layered, recurrent network trained with error
backpropagation to predict future inputs (Elman network). The model unies two
infant studies on causality and occlusion perception. Subsequently, in the second
project, the established framework is extended to a larger prediction network that
models the development of object unity, object permanence and occlusion percep-
tion in infancy. It is shown that these dierent phenomena can be unied into
a single theoretical framework thereby explaining experimental data from 14 in-
fant studies. The framework shows that these developmental phenomena can be
explained by accurately representing and predicting statistical regularities in the
visual environment. The models assume (1) dierent neuronal populations process-
ing dierent motion directions of visual stimuli in the visual cortex of the newborn
infant which are supported by neuroscientic evidence and (2) available learning
algorithms that are guided by the goal of predicting future events. Specically,
the models demonstrate that no innate force notions, motion analysis modules,
common motion detectors, specic perceptual rules or abilities to \reason" about
entities which have been widely postulated in the developmental literature are nec-
essary for the explanation of the discussed phenomena.2 Abstract
Since the prediction of future events turned out to be fruitful for theoretical expla-
nation of various developmental phenomena and a guideline for learning in infancy,
the third model addresses the development of visual expectations themselves. A
self-organising, fully recurrent neural network model that forms internal repre-
sentations of input sequences and maps them onto eye movements is proposed.
The reinforcement learning architecture (RLA) of the model learns to perform
anticipatory eye movements as observed in a range of infant studies. The model
suggests that the goal of maximizing the looking time at interesting stimuli guides
infants' looking behavior thereby explaining the occurrence and development of
anticipatory eye movements and reaction times. In contrast to classical neural
network modelling approaches in the developmental literature, the model uses
local learning rules and contains several biologically plausible elements like exci-
tatory and inhibitory spiking neurons, spike-timing dependent plasticity (STDP),
intrinsic plasticity (IP) and synaptic scaling. It it also novel from the technical
point of view as it uses a dynamic recurrent reservoir shaped by various plasticity
mechanisms and combines it with reinforcement learning. The model accounts for
twelve experimental studies and predicts among others anticipatory behavior for
arbitrary sequences and facilitated reacquisition of already learned sequences.
All models emphasize the development of the perception of the discussed phenom-
ena thereby addressing the questions of how and why this developmental change
takes place - questions that are dicult to be assessed experimentally. Despite the
diversity of the discussed phenomena all three projects rely on the same principle:
the prediction of future events. This principle suggests that cognitive development
in infancy may largely be guided by building internal models and representations
of the visual environment and using those models to predict its future develop-
ment.3
Chapter 1
Introduction
\Studying babies is like studying the Big Bang of cognition. It is where
you can see the building blocks of cognition coming into being and taking
shape, and you start to see the structures that come to make up our
adult cognitive universe." (David Rakison)
In the past decades many elds of interdisciplinary research have developed mo-
tivated by the attempt to understand human cognition. Classically, articial in-
telligence (AI) was mainly dominated by the attempt to make a machine sense
and act intelligently, while the research was largely guided by an intuitive notion
of \intelligence". Specically, the research was not focused on understanding hu-
mans but rather motivated by a poorly understood, introspective notion of what
it means to see, think and act.
With time, people recognized that this kind of research stands on loose grounds
and directed their gaze at actually studying humans, the results of psychology and
neuroscience. The eld of cognitive science emerged - an interdisciplinary eld
consisting of psychology, neuroscience, articial intelligence, mathematics and phi-
losophy. Additionally, researchers coming from the \hard" sciences recognized the
lack of theory and a confusingly large amount of empirical data that still permeate
the biological and psychological sciences. Subsequently, many theoretical and com-
putational models of psychological and biological phenomena emerged with time.
This thesis constitutes an eort to contribute to this line of work in computational
developmental psychology.4 Introduction
1.1 Motivation: why study infants?
This thesis consists of a line of thought mainly motivated by the following ques-
tions: how do infants get started with understanding the world? Specically, how
do infants learn to see? How can we use that knowledge to teach a machine to do
the same? Classically, AI researchers have tried to build in our knowledge about
the world by hand, by ceaselessly typing in millions of common sense knowledge
statements into the machine in order to make it know and to enable it to perform
the same kinds of inferences and tasks that even three-year-olds master without
eort. These projects turned out to be unfeasible and made us understand the
amount of assumptions and knowledge that each of us has acquired since our birth.
Nowadays, most experts agree that the only way to make a machine know what
we know is to make it learn in a similar way that we do. Although this seems
to constitute a promising way of looking at the problem, it turns out that people
use a huge set of intrinsic assumptions even when they learn new things. It seems
that the adult human is too complex a system to get started although research on
adult humans is certainly necessary and pragmatically meaningful. Therefore, if
we want to study the Big Bang of human cognition the human infant seems like a
good starting point.
1.2 The origins of knowledge
1.2.1 Innate or learned?
Accepting that the initial, most important pieces of knowledge about the world are
acquired in infancy begs the question about what that knowledge is. Additionally,
we have to ask whether this knowledge is given at birth, maturates during devel-
opment (nativism) or whether it is learned (empiricism). This nature - nurture
debate can be traced back to the empiricists John Locke and David Hume and
the reactions to their views. Although considered as obsolete by many researchers,
this debate still goes on, see e.g. Spencer et al. (2009).1.2 The origins of knowledge 5
For example, one of the most prominent representatives of current nativism is
Elizabeth S. Spelke who advocated the \core knowledge" hypothesis (Spelke and
Kinzler, 2007). As for the domain of knowledge about na ve physics, infants are
suggested to be endowed with innate knowledge about \cohesion (objects move as
connected, bounded units), continuity (objects move on connected, unobstructed
paths), and contact (objects aect one another's motion if and only if they touch)"
(Spelke, 1994). Given that knowledge, it is conceivable that infants are well
equipped to start acquiring, maybe learning, even more about the objects they
are surrounded with.
Despite the convenience of nativist suggestions, for the present work, these sorts
of views are unsatisfactory for the following reasons. First, for any of the in-
fant's skills, whether learned or innate, we strive to understand how it came about
and merely postulating that it is innate does not satisfy our intellectual demand.
Second, it is unfortunately not rare that empirical research on infants is used to
extrapolate beyond the data to serve nativist arguments. For example, merely the
fact that infants have some cognitive ability as early as at the age of four months
does not prove that it is innate (i.e. given from birth), see Spencer et al. (2009)
for a detailed critique. Finally, from the point of view of a theoretician attempting
to model development, (speculative) innate skills represent additional assumptions
on his theory which he desires to avoid. On the contrary, it seems attractive to
ask how we can build a theory of infant development in which various abilities
are acquired through learning and following a similar development as observed in
infants while making as few assumptions as possible. Only at the end of this long
research eort, if we are able to state with some certainty that there is a small
set of assumptions that are really necessary to get an infant started, only then it
seems justied to postulate them as innate.6 Introduction
1.2.2 The point of debarkment
Given the considerations in the previous section and our decision to study how
infants visually start to extract the relevant knowledge from the world, let us de-
scribe the newborn infant's impression of the world as did William James: \one
great blooming, buzzing confusion" James (1890), p. 462. Imagine that all the
infant has is this chaos of colorful pixels of light that fall on his retina, the ability
to move the eyes and one or more powerful learning mechanisms. How far can we
get from here? It is emphasized that it is by no means asserted that an infant
actually is this tabula rasa. It just seems fruitful from a theoretician's stance to
adopt this view as a starting point justied by pragmatic arguments given in the
previous section.
Further it is necessary to investigate which capacities, what knowledge actually
develops and when it develops under the constraint that it is conceivable that
some learning mechanism may lead the infant from its starting point at birth to
these pieces of knowledge. In other words, it seems instructive to look for pieces
of knowledge that infants have been observed to have at a very young age, such as
the rst months of life.
At this point the theoretician is confronted with a wide array of possible things
that infants could know and the diculty to constrain his eorts to a small set of
phenomena. From a pragmatic point of view though, it is useful to concentrate
on visual scenes and phenomena that actually have been studied experimentally
well enough to present a suciently rich data set for theoretical modeling. In the
following we will review some of the relevant data serving as starting point of this
thesis while also aiming at familiarizing the reader with methods in developmental
psychology of infancy.
1.2.3 Object segmentation and unity
Continuing our heuristic approach, it seems reasonable for the newborn infant to
start segmenting the visual scene into separate objects since it is not clear from1.2 The origins of knowledge 7
the chaos of colorful pixels where objects, including people, begin and end. One of
the prevailing hypotheses known as common fate (Wertheimer, 1923) is that those
parts of the image that move together also belong together as parts of the same
object.
Of course it is not possible to ask preverbal infants whether they perceive an
object as united or not. Children utter their rst words only by the age of 12-18
months (Clark, 2004). Therefore, developmental psychologists have developed an
array of methods in order to investigate what young infant might think. One of
the prevailing methods is the so-called habituation paradigm. Infant habituation
is normally studied within a framework derived from the pioneering work of Soviet
physiologist Evgeni Sokolov and his colleagues (Vinogradova, 1975, Sokolov, 1963,
1975). Within this framework, infants are assumed to build (through learning)
a neural or mental model of stimuli or stimulus events as these are repeatedly
presented. When a stimulus is presented, it is compared to this neural model
and discrepancies provide the basis for learning. This is often referred to as the
comparator theory (Gilmore and Thomas, 2002). As learning progresses, discrep-
ancies between the model and external events decrease, which result in a decrease
of attention (i.e., there is a progressively smaller need to process the information
as the internal model approximates such information). Crucially, it is assumed
that stimuli that deviate from this internal model would elicit a relative increase
in responding (a behavior referred to as dishabituation, release from habituation,
or renewed responding). Indeed, a stimulus perceived as novel would require more
processing than one perceived as familiar.
Renewed responding thus provides researchers with a unique opportunity to in-
vestigate internal representations in preverbal infants. What infants perceive as
novel (inferred from renewed responding) given a set of habitual stimuli or events
allows for inferences as to how they represent information. By carefully designing
stimuli sets, researchers can systematically examine in which ways stimuli may be
represented as distinct.
Kellman and Spelke (1983) did a classic study based on the habituation paradigm
investigating whether 4-month-olds are able to perceive unity of objects. A rod8 Introduction
was moved behind a block as depicted in Fig. 1.1 and it was investigated whether
infants perceive the ends of the rod as connected behind the block. The subjects
were separated into two groups, one habituated with a complete rod moving behind
the block, the \rod movement" group, and another habituated with only the up-
per rod piece moving while the lower rod piece remained stationary, the \baseline"
group. The baseline was introduced in order to rule out alternative explanations
based only on the way the involved objects look like. The infants were shown the
habituation stimuli repeatedly and their looking time was measured until the mean
looking time of three consecutive trials dropped below 50% of the mean looking
time of the rst three consecutive trials.
Figure 1.1: Displays, design and results in the study by Kellman and Spelke (1983).
Left: Two groups of infants were habituated to the \rod movement" and \baseline"
displays, respectively. Then they were tested with the \complete rod" and \broken
rod displays appearing in an alternating fashion. The measurement of looking time
indicated infants' interpretation of the habituation stimulus. Right: Looking times
at the stimuli by infants (A) in the rod movement group and (B) in the baseline
group. Note: For statistical analysis of signicance the reader is referred to the
original publication.1.2 The origins of knowledge 9
After habituation both infant groups were exposed to two test stimuli: the \com-
plete rod" test and the \broken rod" test as depicted in Fig. 1.1, left. The test
stimuli were shown in an alternating way, three times each, resulting in six test
displays. For each test trial the looking time was measured again.
Fig. 1.1, right, shows that infants in the \rod movement" group dishabituated
to the \broken rod" display while showing no dishabituation to the \complete
rod" display. Thus, they generalized their habituation to the \complete rod" dis-
play while dishabituating to the \broken rod" display. On the other hand, the
\baseline" group did not discriminate between the test stimuli.
The result was consistent with the interpretation that infants in the \rod move-
ment group" interpreted the habituation stimulus as a complete rod moving behind
the block. Any intrinsic preference, i.e. increase looking time, for either test dis-
play could be ruled out since the baseline group showed no preference. The study
demonstrates that infants as young as 4 months already seem to know that the
parts of the same object move together in a coherent fashion, i.e. that common
motion indicates a single, connected object.
Another similar study Slater et al. (1990) indicates that newborn infants do not
represent object unity. Naturally, the question arises how infants arrived at this
skill between birth and four months. We will model this phenomenon and suggest
our explanation in chapter 3.
1.2.4 Occlusion and object permanence
Intimately related to the problem of segmentation and object unity is the problem
of occlusion. We may not be aware of this problem since \seeing things" comes to
us so eortlessly. Research in computer vision has become painfully aware of these
diculties: when objects are occluded, what determines their edges? How do we
know how the object looks like behind the occluder? How to deal with dierent
lighting conditions? How to extract the true form of the object even though parts10 Introduction
of it are occluded? These questions pose severe problems in computer vision and
they are currently far from being solved (see e.g. Azad et al. (2008)).
What interests us most is to understand how our eortless ability to extract
(partly) occluded objects from a scene develops in infancy. Maybe then we will
gain insight into adult occlusion perception. Interestingly, very young infants are
not able to represent occluded objects or object parts - this so-called object per-
manence does not develop until the age of 2-6 months (Baillargeon et al., 1985,
Baillargeon, 1987, Johnson et al., 2003). We will turn to the question of occlusion
and object permanence in the chapters 2 and 3 and model the development of
these phenomena in infancy.
1.2.5 Object categorization
Of course, the view that object unity perception can be fully accounted for by the
common fate mechanism is highly simplied. How would an infant perceive unity
of non-moving objects? These issues will be discussed later. As for now, let us
turn to the question of how infants' cognition may develop after having acquired
the ability to perceive objects.
Now that objects have been carved out from the chaotic pixel environment one
might think of categorizing these objects. Intuitively one might think of grouping
objects with similar properties together, like various books, chairs, houses, peo-
ple etc. Classically, object categories have been dened at three dierent levels
of abstraction: subordinate, basic and superordinate/global. For example, the
subordinate-level category \Mercedes" encompassing all Mercedes cars belongs to
the basic-level category \cars" which itself belongs to the superordinate-level cat-
egory \vehicles" (Rosch et al., 1976).
Whether young children begin with the formation of categories at higher or lower
levels of abstraction is still the subject of controversial discussions. Also, dif-
ferent scientic communities developed dierent non-compatible opinions on this
question. For example, the computational neuroscience and computer vision com-
munities prefer the view that objects and their categories are constructed from1.2 The origins of knowledge 11
their specic features such that higher level categories are acquired through ab-
straction from lower level categories, see e.g. Rolls and Deco (2002). This view
is suggested by the current hierarchical and feedforward conception of the visual
system. According to that view, visual information spreads from the retina to
the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) and then to the most occipital part of our
brain, the primary visual cortex V1. From there this information is thought to
spread to higher areas while branching into two visual streams. Important for our
discussion here is that the retina is thought to process the visual scene on a pixel
level, V1 neurons have been shown to react to edges, i.e. arrays of pixels, V2 to
edge congurations and nally at some point the inferotemporal cortex (IT) to
whole objects, see e.g. Zigmond et al. (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that object
recognition and categorization is viewed as a result of an complex abstraction pro-
cess running through the processing stages of the visual system. According to this
view, subordinate categories are expected to develop rst, basic level later and the
global level at last.
The history of opinions in the eld of developmental psychology has been some-
what dierent. For a long time, basic-level categories were considered to develop
rst (prior to higher-order categories) because exemplars of a given basic-level
category look more similar to each other than exemplars of a given higher-level
category (Rosch and Mervis, 1975) and because the rst category words uttered
by infants tend to belong to the basic level (Mervis, 1987), i.e. \dog" is uttered
earlier than \poodle" or \animal". Contradicting this developmental hypothesis,
later studies on categorization in infancy suggest the existence of a global-to-basic
level shift during the rst years of life (Mandler and McDonough, 1993, 1998).
According to this idea, infants' initial categories may be rather broad in nature.
In one of these studies infants were given plastic replicas of objects to freely ex-
plore, see Fig. 1.2. Each session consisted of eight familiarization trials and two
test trials, e.g. a dog, bird, cat, horse, dog, bird, cat, horse and then a sh and an
airplane. \sh" is a new object from the familiar category while \airplane" is a
new object from a new category. The rationale of the study was the following: if
infants consistently examined the new object from the new category (\airplane")12 Introduction
Figure 1.2: Objects for object-examining task in the categorization experiments
(Mandler and McDonough, 1993).
signicantly longer than the new object from the familiar category (\sh") then
it can be concluded that infants are able to discriminate those two categories. In-
deed, it turned out that 9-month-old infants are able to distinguish animals and
vehicles, i.e. a distinction at the global level. This task is not easy to perform be-
cause solely on the basis of how the objects look like it is dicult to classify them
into animals and vehicles. On the other hand, after performing a similar study at
the basic level probing the ability to discriminate dogs from shes, Fig. 1.2, left,
infants failed. For example, infants would be familiarized with a series of eight
dogs and then tested with a new dog and a sh. In a control study the researchers
tested the discrimination of birds with spread out wings vs. airplanes. To the
researchers' surprise, infants did discriminate them although they were percep-
tually very similar, see Fig. 1.2, right. Consistently Pauen (2002) showed that
8-month-olds are able to discriminate animals and furniture (global level) in an1.2 The origins of knowledge 13
object examination task while failing to discriminate dogs from birds and chairs
from tables (basic level). Four months later, those infants, now 12 months old,
succeeded in the discrimination at both levels.
In summary, infant research in the last two decades suggests that the direction
of development in object categorization goes from global to basic to subordinate
- the opposite direction as thought by the computational neuroscience and vision
community. Specically, this research shows that there is more going on in object
categorization in infancy than just similarity judgments and abstractions. More-
over, it highlights that it may not be that important to recognize the details of
objects in order to categorize them in meaningful entities.
Thinking more profoundly about this issue leads us to the following questions.
First, why do infants from these global categories animals vs. artifacts before be-
ing able to distinguish e.g. animals from each other? And second, how is it possible
to make these distinctions given that both animals look dierent from artifacts but
also animals look dierent from each other and artifacts look dierent from each
other? The straightforward answer that comes to mind is that objects are cat-
egorized based on the role they play in the world. It is about their actions and
behavior in the world and not so much about their looks. After all, a house is not
a house because it has vertical walls and a roof and windows etc. but because peo-
ple live in it. Houses (chairs, people, furniture, vehicles,...) can look so dierent
but humans are still able to categorize them eortlessly because they understand
the role that these objects play in the world. Mandler (1992) suggests how this
problem may be approached. For example, the distinction between animals and
artifacts may be based on a primitive understanding of what living beings are vs.
non-living ones, e.g. living beings move in a self-propelled way while artifacts usu-
ally move only when caused to.
This discussion leads us to the following research direction. It may not be im-
portant to recognize, categorize or understand details of the visual scene. This is
even more true given that infants' visual resolution is very bad in the rst months
of life, see e.g. Kellman and Arterberry (1998). Maybe infants start, after segment-
ing the scene into objects, by putting them into global and meaningful categories14 Introduction
according to the role that the objects play in the world. The distinction of animate
vs. inanimate or caused motion may be a starting point.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
Given the previous discussion, as a rst step, we will attempt to model causal-
ity and occlusion perception in infancy in chapter 2 motivated by the conjecture
that it reveals something about the rst categorizations of animate vs. inanimate.
We will try to build unied models that capture several phenomena because that
in this way we may reveal important principles of cognitive development in infancy.
In Chapter 3 we will turn to the important problem of object unity which will
turn out to be necessary to solve in order to proceed. Again, we will strive for
unied models that also capture occlusion and object permanence and in principle
even causality as well.
In Chapter 4 we will develop our thoughts further that lead us to the question
of how infants learn regularities in the environment in the rst place. This will be
examined in Chapter 5 where we investigate the formation of visual expectations
in sequence learning in infancy.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we will draw conclusions from this PhD work and outline
areas of possible future progress.15
Chapter 2
Development of causality and
occlusion perception
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we investigate the development of causality and occlusion percep-
tion in infancy. As for causality, the discussion can be traced back to Hume (1740)
in whose classical account the perception of causality in simple mechanical events
is the result of repeated experiences of a constant conjunction between two events.
Michotte (1963) argued that causality could be perceived directly, for example,
when one billiard ball collides with and launches another. He believed that in
order to gain a \causal percept" infants would at least have to see enough \inter-
nal structure" to segregate a launching sequence into two movement components.
Leslie (1994) believed that an innate notion of force or pressure is needed and
that the perception of cause and eect is performed by an innate motion analysis
module. Mandler (2004) suggested that seeing transfer of motion may provide the
basis of infants' early interpretation of causal physical events and that no notions
of force or pressure are necessary. We demonstrate that this is possible by con-
structing a computational model that learns to represent launching and occlusion
events by merely observing them and detecting statistical regularities in them. We
show that this model explains one of the fundamental experiments on the percep-
tion of causality in infants (Leslie, 1982) while no innate force notions or modules
are needed.16 Development of causality and occlusion perception
The model is an articial neural network that is trained to predict its future
inputs. We are going to model two experiments on causality and occlusion percep-
tion that rely on the habituation paradigm (see Sect. 1.2.3). The network's error
in predicting its next input is used to model the infant looking time since novelty
can be seen as a prediction failure. Prediction learning has been highlighted by
a number of developmental theorists (Elman, 1990, McClelland, 1995, Schlesinger
and Young, 2003). To our knowledge, the rst attempt to analogize the error in
neural networks to infant looking time has been made by (Mareschal et al., 2000).
We extend this line of work by additionally pre-training the network which is es-
sential in this kind of modeling as will be argued in Sect. 2.2.2.
Using a connectionist prediction framework and we show that much of the ba-
sic physical knowledge need not be innate but can be learned with a small set of
prior capacities.
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 General architecture
We used a simple recurrent network, also known as the Elman network (Elman,
1990). It consists of four layers of articial neurons, named input, hidden, output
and context layers, respectively (Fig. 2.1). The inputs to units in the hidden
and output layers were weighted sums of the responses, Xi, C0
j, Yj, from units at
previous layers. The outputs Yj and Zi of the units were Fermi functions of the
input:
Yj =
"
1 + exp
 
 
M X
i=0
vijXi +
N X
j0=1
uj0jCj0
!# 1
(2.1)
and
Zi =
"
1 + exp
 
 
N X
j=0
wjiYj
!# 1
; (2.2)
where vij, uj0j and wji are the weights. Every hidden and output unit had an
additional constant input X0 and Y0 equal to 1. The weights v0j and w0i of these2.2 Methods 17
Figure 2.1: The Elman network
supplementary inputs act as threshold values for each unit and are also learned.
The context layer derives its activity from the hidden layer by copying its activity
at each time step: Cj := Yj. The Elman network is presented a temporal series
of inputs Xi(t);Xi(t + 1);Xi(t + 2);::: and its task is to learn from this sequence
and predict the next input Xi(t + 1). We trained the network with the standard
backpropagation algorithm minimizing the sum of the squares of the dierence
between the output Zi(t) and the next input Xi(t+1). In our model we relate the
prediction error
E(t) 
M X
i=1
jZi(t   1)   Xi(t)j (2.3)18 Development of causality and occlusion perception
to the looking time in experiments with infants1.
Our model is constructed to predict occlusion and launching events. Therefore, it
is necessary to represent motion and depth. In order to do so we split up the in-
put layer into three maps, the \motion detectors" (rst 7 units), \disparity" units
(next 7 units) and \novelty" units (next 14 units) that represent the novelty of the
environment. The network is used to model the visual events in Fig. 2.3. Fig. 2.2a)
shows the inputs to the network at a launching event. The motion detector map
is only active for a moving object (pixel). A unit is set to 1 if motion is present (in
any direction) and to 0 otherwise. In order to predict occlusion events successfully
it is necessary to distinguish at least three depth relations: farther away, same dis-
tance and closer than the object participating in the occlusion event. Therefore,
units in the depth map can have three values, 0.0, 0.5 and 1.0, respectively. In
Fig. 2.2g) we see an example of an occlusion event. The idea of the novelty map
is that everything is new to an infant when it comes to the laboratory which leads
to large looking times at rst trials (see Sect. 2.2.2 for details).
2.2.2 Training
The network was trained in three phases: pre-training, habituation and test phase.
In habituation studies infants are habituated to a repeating stimulus until the look-
ing time drops and the habituation phase is terminated. Then infants are presented
test stimuli. Our model was trained in a similar way except that a pre-training
phase is needed. The pre-training models the visual experience of the infant since
it had experience with the world before coming to the laboratory. Without pre-
training the network would only learn what is presented during the habituation
phase, from which no interesting results can be expected.
We pre-trained the network in the following way. A freely moving (not occluded)
pixel moved back and forth as displayed in Fig. 2.2h). This motion was halted and
reinitiated with probability of 5% at each time step. Another non-moving pixel
was added or removed with probability of 1% (at each time step) at a random
1The prediction error could have as well been dened as the objective function (sum of squared
errors) which is simpler to treat mathematically because of the well-dened derivative.2.2 Methods 19
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Figure 2.2: Habituation (a,b,c,g) and test (d,e,f,h,i) stimuli. Motion detector and
disparity layers are displayed on top of each other, red pixels indicating motion
detector activity and green scale values indicating disparity cell activity. Note
that whenever a motion detector is active the corresponding disparity cell's activ-
ity is 0:5 (resulting in the mixed color orange). a) direct launching - rst pixel
launches the second pixel. b) delayed launching - second pixel moves o 2 time
steps after collision. c) launching-without-collision - second pixel moves o without
being touched. d) no-reaction - rst pixel collides with second pixel which fails to
move. e) no-prior-movement - second pixel moves without prior movement of rst
pixel. f) no-reaction-no-collision - rst pixel stops before touching the second pixel
which remains inert. g) occluded trajectory - pixel moves back and forth behind
an occluder. h) continuous trajectory - pixel moves freely without occlusions or
collisions. i) discontinuous trajectory - interrupted pixel motion
position. When this second pixel was there, its depth was chosen to be 0.5 or 1.0
with equal probability, so that the pixel either became an obstacle or an occluder.
In the occluder case the stimuli were like in Fig. 2.2g) where occlusions could oc-
cur at any position. In the obstacle case a launching event occured when the rst
(moving) pixel collided with the second one (see Fig. 2.2a)). During pre-training
the occluder or obstacle could be at any position in the visual eld, while during
the habituation and test phases the stimuli were exactly those shown in Fig. 2.2.
The stimuli during the pre-training were constrained to \possible" ones, i.e. to
stimuli that we would expect to occur naturally like direct launching, occlusion or
just free motion. By doing this we model the infant's pre-experimental experience
with the world. Varying the pre-training time allows us to look inside the devel-
opment of the model - therefore, the pre-training time corresponds to the age of
the infant. The novelty units are set to a constant but random binary vector. The20 Development of causality and occlusion perception
network was pre-trained for 5  105 time steps and the weights were saved every
1000 time steps. Then we performed the experiments described below using these
saved weights that represent the developmental progress of the network.
2.3 Perception of causality: modeling Experi-
ment 1 by Leslie (1982)
2.3.1 Description of the original experiment
Leslie (1982) tested how 4.5- and 8-month-old infants perceive a launching event.
The stimuli are shown in Fig. 2.3a)-f). Infants were habituated to a cube starting
to move and launching another cube which starts to move with the same speed as
the rst one while the rst one stops moving after the collision (direct launching).
Another group of infants was habituated to the same stimuli except that the start
of motion of the second cube was delayed (delayed launching). A third group of
infants was presented a launching event without the rst cube touching the second
one. It stopped at some distance before but the second cube started to move o im-
mediately just as if it had been launched (launching without collision). All infants
were tested with basically two kinds of events: rst cube moving, colliding with
the second, stopping but without any reaction of the second cube (no-reaction).
Alternatively, the second cube just started to move by itself without prior motion
of the rst cube (no-prior-movement). In Fig. 2.2a) - f) we see how these events
have been presented to the neural network.
Leslie investigated whether infants perceive the rst cube as causing the second
cube to move. The idea was that introducing a temporal or spatial gap between
the two cubes would make the infants perceive two independent motions: one
cube staring, moving and stopping and then the second one doing the same -
which corresponds to the test stimuli. Therefore, Leslie hypothesized that infants
who were habituated with the delayed launching or launching-without-collision
sequence would dishabituate less to the test stimuli than the infants exposed to the
direct launching sequence. We will discuss the results together with the modeling2.3 Perception of causality: modeling Experiment 1 by Leslie (1982)21
Figure 2.3: Stimuli in Experiment 1 from Leslie (1982).
results below in Sect. 2.3.3.
2.3.2 Modeling procedure
After the pre-training the network was trained repeatedly with the direct launching
stimulus in Fig. 2.2a) (alternately b) or c)) for 100 time steps (habituation phase).
Then, the total prediction error which is the sum of the prediction error over the
18 time steps of a stimulus (see Fig. 2.2) was calculated. After habituation, the
test stimuli were presented once and the prediction error was calculated again.
The direct and delayed launching habituations were tested with the no-reaction
and no-prior-movement stimuli whereas the launching-without-collision habitua-
tion was tested with the no-reaction-no-collision and the no-prior-movement stim-
uli thereby modeling the original study procedure. During the habituation and
test trials the novelty units were switched to a dierent binary random but con-22 Development of causality and occlusion perception
stant vector indicating the novelty of the laboratory environment (the novelty units
don't play any role in this experiment but are important for the control case in
the occlusion experiment below).
2.3.3 Results
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Figure 2.4: a) Dishabituation times in the causality study (Leslie, 1982). For
analysis of statistical signicance see original publication. b) Dishabituation errors
in the model. c) Dishabituation errors as a function of pre-training time. d)
Dishabituation errors collapsed over habituation conditions.
The whole simulation was run 40 times. In Fig. 2.4 the results together with the
results of the original experiment are shown.
Experimental result:
Looking times declined signicantly from rst to last habituation trials.
Model account:
During the habituation phase the stimulus was repeated over and over (100 / 182.3 Perception of causality: modeling Experiment 1 by Leslie (1982)23
 5-6 trials). Thus, the network learned to predict the stimulus better, i.e. its pre-
diction error dropped with time. As we relate the prediction error to the looking
time of infants this accounts for this result.
Experimental result:
The group shown the direct launching stimulus increased its looking time sig-
nicantly more than the group shown delayed launching or launching-without-
collision.
Model account:
Since the network was exposed to direct launching stimuli during pre-training al-
ready, there was not much to learn during the direct launching habituation. On the
contrary, the other two habituation stimuli were more dicult to learn. Thus, the
prediction errors of the last habituation trials were lowest in the direct launching
case. Therefore, the network's \dishabituation" to the no-reaction test was higher
after direct launching as compared to the other habituation cases (see Fig. 2.4b).
Experimental result:
The no-prior-movement stimulus attracted signicantly longer looking times than
the no-reaction stimulus, regardless of the group.
Model account:
During habituation the network learned to expect the rst pixel to start mov-
ing which happens in the no-reaction test but does not happen in the no-prior-
movement test. Thus, in the no-prior-movement test, the network keeps predicting
the rst pixel to start moving which does not happen and yields an additional pre-
diction error (see Fig. 2.4d).
2.3.4 Model predictions
Although Leslie did not nd any signicant age eects, we see in his results,
Fig. 2.4a), that the mean dishabituation time is higher for older infants (which
could be random, of course). On the contrary, as displayed in Fig. 2.4c), our
model predicts that overall dishabituation times increase with age which is due
to the fact that the habituation stimuli can be learned quicker and better after a
long pre-training. Another prediction is that the direct launching results should
be more similar to the delayed launching and launching-without-collision results24 Development of causality and occlusion perception
for younger infants. This is due to the fact that the dishabituation errors are
higher in the direct launching condition only because of prior exposure to direct
launching stimuli during pre-training. If, on the other hand, pre-training is short
(young infants) then this eect vanishes as conrmed by Fig. 2.4b).
2.4 Perception of occlusion: modeling Experi-
ment 1 by Johnson et al. (2003)
2.4.1 Description of the original experiment
The experimenters tested 4- and 6-month-old infants and discovered an interesting
eect in occlusion perception. They habituated the infants with a ball oscillating
back and forth behind an occluder. Then two kinds of test displays were presented,
both without any occluder: the rst test display showed the ball continuously os-
cillating and the second test display showed the ball oscillating discontinuously, i.e.
they used the same display as in the habituation but they removed the occluder
such that it appeared that the ball oscillates but disappears behind an invisible
occluder and reappears at its other end again. A separate control group was shown
the same test stimuli but without prior habituation in order to control for some
baseline preference for one of the test displays. In Fig. 2.2 we see the corresponding
habituation, g), and test stimuli, h) and i), that we used in our model.
If infants perceive the ball as continuing to move behind the occluder during habit-
uation then they should generalize their habituation to the continuously moving
ball and show increased looking time at the discontinuous test display. However,
if infants just learn the motion of the ball \by heart" then they should generalize
this perception to the discontinuous case which is identical to the ball's motion in
the habituation display. Thus, they should dishabituate more to the continuous
display. The experimenters found that 4-month-olds show a preference for the con-
tinuous display but 6-month-olds dishabituate more to the discontinuous display
(Fig. 2.5a)).2.4 Perception of occlusion: modeling Experiment 1 by Johnson et al.
(2003) 25
2.4.2 Modeling procedure
After pre-training the network was habituated repeatedly with the stimulus in
Fig. 2.2g) for 1000 time steps. After habituation the network was tested again
once with the two stimuli Fig. 2.2h) and i) and the prediction errors, Eexp
cont and
Eexp
discont were calculated. The prediction error was also calculated for the last
habituation trial, Eexp
baseline, in order to be able to calculate the dishabituation
time later.
Just as in the real experiment we also modeled the situation of the control group,
i.e. we took the pre-trained weights, tested them directly without prior habitua-
tion and calculated again the prediction errors Econtrol
cont and Econtrol
discont. In order
to assess the dishabituation errors we presented the occlusion display 2.2g) once
to the pre-trained network having still the old novelty units (see Sect. 2.4.3 for
the role of the novelty units). This prediction error, Econtrol
baseline, re
ects how the
network had learned so far.
Finally, we calculated the \looking preferences", P, for the experimental and con-
trol conditions, respectively.
P 
Ediscont   Ebaseline
(Econt   Ebaseline) + (Ediscont   Ebaseline)
(2.4)
The dierence between the test error and the baseline error (last habituation error)
is what we call the dishabituation error which is analogous to the dishabituation
time in real experiments. In the original experiment the researchers used the same
formula for the preference except the baseline values, i.e. they took the raw looking
times to the test stimuli.
2.4.3 Results
The whole simulation was run 40 times. In Fig. 2.5 the model as well as the ex-
perimental results are shown.
Experimental result:
4-month-old show a preference for the continuous display whereas 6-month-olds26 Development of causality and occlusion perception
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Figure 2.5: Development of looking preferences for the continuous vs. discontinu-
ous displays in a) experiment and b) model. The gray shaded areas denote error
bars based on 40 simulations.
prefer the discontinuous display.
Model account:
In Fig. 2.5 we see that the preference rst goes down to about 0:46 after 30000 time
steps and then increases until is saturates at 0:62 as a function of the pre-training
time steps. Since the pre-training time corresponds to the infant age we get a
similar result as observed experimentally. The preference curve can be explained
in the following way: After 0 time steps the network did not predict any output at
all. Therefore, the test displays are equal to the errors which are both large and
lead to a preference around 0:5. After 30000 time steps the network has learned to
predict the trajectory of the pixel except at the occlusion position to some extent.
It basically learned the pixel motion \by heart". This is the same case as before
but only with smaller errors in total such that the failure to predict the contin-
uous trajectory at the occlusion position gained more weight (preference for the
continuous display increased). After the network has been exposed long enough
to pre-training stimuli it learned to predict continuous trajectories and also that
a trajectory is suppressed whenever there is an occluder. Therefore the network
predicts the continuous display successfully but fails to predict the discontinuous
one since it expects the pixel to move on in the absence of an occluder (preference
for the discontinuous display).
Experimental result:2.4 Perception of occlusion: modeling Experiment 1 by Johnson et al.
(2003) 27
The control group showed no preference for either test display.
Model account:
This is due to the general novelty of the laboratory environment. As the network
was shown test stimuli without prior habituation it could not learn the value of the
new novelty units which increases the total prediction error. Of course the network
did have a baseline preference for the discontinuous (\unnatural") display after a
long pre-training time. But this dierence was small as compared to the predic-
tion errors of the novelty units and reduced the total preference to around 0.5.
Therefore we suspect that there may be a baseline preference also in infants but
the novelty of the laboratory environment makes any preference non-signicant.
Object permanence
In contrary to real experiments with infants we can examine how the system
achieves its performance. First it learns to predict freely moving pixels in either
direction. But then, when an occluder is present, it simply learned to suppress the
output of the motion detector layer at the position of the occluder. This is done
by a few hidden units that are mainly driven by the activity of the disparity layer
cell that represents the existence of an occluder. Whenever these hidden units are
active they suppress the activity of the motion detector output layer at the same
position where the occluder occurred by feeding in strongly negative connection
weights to them. In this way the other hidden layer units do predict a moving
pixel to continue its motion at the occluder position but the actual output of this
prediction is suppressed by the former hidden units. Therefore, the network con-
tinues to represent the motion of the pixel even though there is an occluder which
is exactly what object permanence means. We did not foresee this capacity of the
network to develop, it just emerged as a solution to the occlusion problem.
2.4.4 Model predictions
As we can see from Fig. 2.5b) the model predicts that infants' preference should
be similar to the model curve if the experiment will be performed for other ages
as well.28 Development of causality and occlusion perception
2.5 Discussion
In the original causality experiment Leslie (1982) asked whether infants perceive
two cube movements, one continuously causing to move the other. They found
that the perception of \causality" is disrupted if a temporal or a spatial gap is in-
troduced between cause and eect. A gap would supposedly lead to the perception
of two separate, independent movements whereas a direct launching is supposed
to be perceived as two conjoined movements.
The model can be said to provide a similar but a much more precise account.
There are no two separate movements in the model. There are just sequences
of input vectors. But the model learned that whenever a pixel approaches and
touches a resting pixel it stops and makes the latter move in the same direction.
Specically, it learned that the second one moves o immediately (direct launch-
ing). Therefore, the model \dishabituates" more when presented a no-reaction
test as compared to the condition where it has been habituated to delayed launch-
ing. Thus, there is no need for innate force notions of motion analysis modules
as has been proposed by Leslie (1994) whose experiment we modeled. Our model
accounts for his data while suggesting that causality can be learned by merely
observing the visual environment, registering statistical regularities and trying to
predict them.
In the occlusion experiment (Johnson et al., 2003) the researchers wanted to know
whether infants are able to perceive a continuous trajectory although partially oc-
cluded. They found that 6-month-olds seem to perceive the trajectory veridically
but 4-month-olds do not - they rather seem to perceive two distinct sections of the
trajectory. This makes sense with regard to our model. Before learning enough
about the continuity of a trajectory the model/infant can not know that it must
be continuing behind an occluder. Only after being able to successfully predict
a free trajectory the road is free to follow an object behind an occluder with the
\mind's eye". This is exactly what happened in the model and object permanence
emerged as discussed above.
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future inputs - that was able to develop representations for causality and occlusion
perception as well as object permanence. It has learned about the continuity of
object motion, about solidity and reaction of objects to contact. Therefore, there
is no need to postulate innate principles as had been suggested by Spelke (1994).
In our model we show that all these properties can be simply derived from statis-
tical motion properties of raw visual input.
One drawback of the model is that it uses backpropagation of an error signal
which is not biologically plausible if we want the framework to be a model of the
infant brain. This is certainly a weakness but can be overcome by just using a
more plausible network, e.g. a dynamic reservoir network with spiking neurons
that have been shown to be able to perform prediction tasks (Lazar et al., 2007).
A major topic of future work will be to provide the model with an active rep-
resentation of occluded scenes. Although this model shows object permanence,
i.e. it represents occluded inputs, it cannot do so for more than one time step and
it cannot habituate to what it merely represents and can only habituate to actual,
real inputs. This is important since many experiments rely on the observation that
infants apparently can habituate to things they don't see but only represent. This
issue will be addressed in the next chapter as we model object unity and occlusion
perception where we continue our eort to unify dierent aspects infants' basic
physical knowledge about the world in a single computational theory.30 Development of causality and occlusion perception31
Chapter 3
Development of object unity,
object permanence and occlusion
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3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we investigated how infants may perceive launching and
occlusion events. In doing so, we abstracted from the visual appearance of the
involved objects to single pixels in the input layer of our articial neural network.
This begs the question of how infants arrive at this level of abstraction in the rst
place, i.e. it is important to investigate how infants arrive at perceiving objects at
all.
Therefore, understanding that our world consists of objects that move coherently
on continuous paths and that keep existing even when occluded is an important
step in our development. For example, research on the perception of object unity
seems to have converged on the result that by roughly four months infants show
the ability to interpret a rod moving behind a block as complete although only the
rod ends are visible (Kellman and Spelke, 1983, Johnson and Aslin, 1995, Johnson
and N a~ nez, 1995), see Fig. 1.1. Some developmental researchers concluded that
the perception of object unity is one of the pieces of \core knowledge" that infants
are hypothesized to be innately endowed with (Spelke, 1990). On the other hand,32
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there is evidence that newborn infants are not able to perceive object unity (Slater
et al., 1990), which makes it dicult to explain the phenomenon in nativist terms.
Another ability that develops early in infancy is object permanence (Baillargeon
et al., 1985, Baillargeon, 1987) and tracking of occluded object trajectories (John-
son et al., 2003, von Hofsten et al., 2007) that we started to investigate in the
previous chapter.
Most prior studies and theoretical models highlighted only one of these aspects of
an infant's perception or cognition. A unied model of object unity and occlusion
perception has not been suggested yet, which is important since it can potentially
reveal general principles that guide development. In this chapter we attempt to
make another step in this direction and to provide a computational model of the
development of object unity, object permanence, and tracking of objects behind
occluders. We present an articial recurrent neural network that is trained with
dierent occlusion events, learns to represent occluded parts of objects, \perceiv-
ing" their unity, can keep the representation over short time intervals and also
track objects that disappear and reappear behind occluders. In order to model
infants' learning from the environment, we pre-train the network with stimuli that
might be analogous to the ones that infants are exposed to during the develop-
ment. Importantly, the network is not pre-trained dierently for each experiment
since infants are not prepared for the specic studies either.1 Conversely, we pre-
train the network only once and then perform all experiments. After pre-training
we expose the network to habituation and test stimuli and compare its perfor-
mance with infant data. The principle that guides the learning of the network is
the prediction of future inputs (Elman, 1990). We show that this approach can
successfully explain in total 12 studies covering several aspects of infants' visual
development and is also able to make specic predictions for future studies.
In this chapter our model replicates and extends the ideas of the model in the
previous chapter on object tracking behind occluders. Specally, the development
of object tracking behind occuders of varying sizes will be investigated here. We
1Use of language: throughout this chapter the term \experiment" is meant to refer to modeling
experiments as opposed to the term \study" which denotes infant experiments.3.1 Introduction 33
refrain from modeling causality perception here although it could still be embed-
ded in the present framework (see Sect. 3.7.3 for discussion).
Assumptions
In order for the model to be most helpful for the developmental researcher, we
summarize here our assumptions.
1. Infants acquire the abilities in all three domains (object unity, ob-
ject permanence and occlusion) by learning spatio-temporal corre-
lations in the environment, whereas learning is
guided by the same principle: the prediction of future inputs /
events. The way this can be achieved is demonstrated by the model.
2. During development infants are exposed to both occlusions and
unoccluded moving and stationary objects. Objects occur in all
combinations, i.e. moving or stationary objects occur in front of
and behind other moving or stationary objects. This assumption
should be obvious since occlusions of moving or stationary stimuli are indeed
ubiquitous in everyday visual environment.
3. During the habituation studies, infants form interpretations of the
habituation stimulus which are compared to (interpretations of)
the test stimulus. The dierence between them drives their look-
ing time. This is a broadly accepted way of interpreting habituation ex-
periments with occluded stimuli, see e.g. Baillargeon (1999), Johnson et al.
(2003), Kellman and Spelke (1983).
4. Stimuli with dierent motion direction as well as background and
foreground stimuli are processed by dierent neural populations.
The choice of neurons tuned to motion direction is biologically plausible since
there are velocity tuned cells in the primary visual cortex (Orban et al., 1986).
Moreover, it is justied to assume the model's sensitivity to motion since it is
well established that neonates react strongly to moving stimuli (Slater et al.,34
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1985). As for the background-foreground separation there is some evidence
that neonates are already able to do simple gure-ground segregation (Slater
et al., 1990). Although this does not necessarily entail that background and
foreground stimuli are generally processed by dierent neural populations,
it is still true for most cases where foreground and background stimuli are
in motion relatively to each other and are therefore processed by dierent
velocity-tuned neurons as mentioned above. Moreover, the separation of the
hidden layer into a foreground and a background layer is not strictly neces-
sary and has only technical reasons since learning in such a large network
is dicult. In the previous chapter we already demonstrated that object
permanence and tracking can be modeled with a single hidden layer.
In order to test whether this set of assumptions is indeed sucient to explain
the development of object unity, permanence and tracking, we instantiated the
assumptions in a simple recurrent network model.
3.2 Computational model
3.2.1 General architecture
The computational model2 consists of two simple recurrent networks that are
trained to predict their next inputs (Elman, 1990) as depicted in Fig. 3.1. The in-
put layers are presented binary vectors of activity which are fed to the hidden and
output layers consisting of sigmoidal neurons (for details see Sect. 3.8.1). At each
time step, the hidden layer activities are copied into the respective context layers
which feed the activity back to the hidden layers via trainable weights. This is the
only place where recurrency is introduced. Each visual scene is divided into six
77 pixel maps, three background maps and three foreground maps, see Fig. 3.2.
The background and foreground maps consist of left motion, right motion and
stationary maps, respectively, resulting in 7  7  6 = 294 input units. Each map
can be thought of consisting of velocity tuned neurons, i.e. if a partly occluded rod
moves to the right then the \right motion" background map and the \stationary"
2MATLAB code is available upon request.3.2 Computational model 35
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Figure 3.1: The network architecture consists of two simple recurrent networks
(gray and black) with a common output layer. The network is trained by back-
propagation through time to predict future inputs.
foreground map encode the stimulus.
3.2.2 Pre-training
Before coming to the laboratory for an experimental study, infants have gath-
ered plenty of visual experience. Therefore, we include a pre-training phase where
the network is presented stimuli that model the infants' visual experience before
coming to the laboratory. These stimuli are unrelated to the experiments. The
pre-training phase is necessary for modeling habituation studies during develop-
ment since the behavior during the studies has to depend on prior knowledge.36
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Figure 3.2: Input coding in the network via six maps where each map is a 7 
7 dimensional binary vector. Each stimulus is segregated into foreground and
background, each consisting of \left motion", \right motion" and \stationary"
maps.
The network is trained to predict the input in the next time step. For train-
ing, the backpropagation through time algorithm is used (Hertz et al., 1991), see
Sect. 3.8.2 for details.
During pre-training the network is presented rectangular objects moving and oc-
cluding each other or moving freely without occluder, see e.g. Fig. 3.3, \rod move-
ment" or \complete rod" displays. The underlying reasoning is that once the
network learns to predict a freely moving (not occluded) object, it keeps its rep-3.2 Computational model 37
resentation in the hidden layer even though the object disappears during occlu-
sion. Note that background and foreground are encoded by distinct hidden layers.
Therefore, during occlusion the background hidden layer has no information about
the occluder, its input disappears for the time of occlusion and reappears at the
opposite edge of the occluder. As we will see, the hidden layer learns to keep its
representation of the moving (background) object until it reappears again. Note
that the foreground and background parts of the network are completely symmet-
ric and are also treated in a symmetric way.
The inputs during pre-training are constructed in the following way. The net-
work inputs are initialized to displaying two objects, one in the background and
one in the foreground. Each object is switched on with the probability of 0.7,
thus, sometimes both objects are present, sometimes only one and sometimes no
object. In the latter case there is no input to the network. Every object is a rect-
angle with a specic width, height, velocity (moving one pixel per time step to the
left, to the right or stationary) and position in the 7  7 pixel input grid. From
the two objects one is labeled \narrow" and the other one as \wide". A narrow
object has always width one, while its height h is drawn from the uniform distri-
bution f1;2;:::;7g. As for the wide object, the width is drawn from the uniform
distribution f1;2;:::;7g and the height similarly from f1;2;:::;5g. The y-position
of every object is chosen such that the object is centered in the input grid, i.e.
y  4   
oor(h=2). Also the velocity of each object is picked from the uniform
distribution on f 1;0;+1g.
Having congured the objects and their properties the pre-training is started.
At each time step this conguration is reset with probability of 0.04 according to
the constraints dened above, i.e. most of the time the congured objects stay and
move the way they are dened to, but once in a while the whole conguration is
changed. The change involves a new pick of the objects' properties (width, height,
velocity and position) and swapping the labels \narrow" and \wide" which put the
narrow object sometimes in the foreground and sometimes in the background. For
moving objects the x-position performs an oscillation around the central position
4 with amplitude 7, i.e. every time x reaches the position  3 or 11, the sign of the
velocity is reversed. Note that this amplitude is large enough for the objects to38
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disappear from the display of width 7.
3.2.3 Habituation
Comparable to infants, the network is exposed to habituation and test phases after
pre-training, see e.g. Fig. 3.3, left. During habituation a specic stimulus is shown
for 1000 time steps while learning is still switched on. This corresponds to 62
trials roughly, since each trial consists of 16 time steps. This is apparently not in
a realistic range but it re
ects a general diculty of learning in neural networks:
the relation of the number of weight updates to real time is arbitrary. Note that
without pre-training the network would only learn from the habituation stimulus
from which no interesting results can be expected.
3.2.4 Tests and performance measurement
After habituation two particular test sequences are presented to the network. Dur-
ing habituation it is conjectured that infants interpret the visual scene in a par-
ticular way. This interpretation must be kept in short term memory until the
tests are presented. If the infant generalizes from the habituation stimulus to the
test stimulus, it will not dishabituate to it, i.e. the looking time will not increase.
Otherwise the infant is surprised, which results in an increase in looking time.
By analogy to infants, we construct the following performance measure in the
computational model. Suppose a rod moves behind a block as depicted in Fig. 3.3,
\rod movement" display. If the network learns well it develops a representation
of the complete rod in the background hidden layer even though the central part
is missing. Thus, it infers and internally represents a complete rod during habit-
uation. To assess the performance, the dierence between this representation and
the test displays is computed (see Sect. 3.8.3 for details). If e.g. the representation
corresponds to a complete rod and the test display shows a complete rod as well
then this dierence will be small. On the other hand, if the test display shows
a broken rod, the dierence will be large. In the following, this dierence will
be called dishabituation error, E, in analogy to the dishabituation time in infant3.3 Perception of object unity 39
studies.
For every test this yields two dishabituation errors, E1 and E2. The network's
preference, P, is then given by
P =
E2
E1 + E2
: (3.1)
Eq. (3.1) is the same performance measure as used in some infant studies (Johnson
et al., 2003).
3.3 Perception of object unity
The perception of object unity is an important aspect of the understanding of
visual scenes. If we did not know which parts of the visual input belong to the
same object we could not categorize the world into objects and assign properties
to them. Because this capacity is so crucial many studies have been conducted on
this topic. In this section we will present some of those studies, the results of our
model and make predictions about new studies.
3.3.1 How does the perception of object unity develop?
S1: Original studies
In Sect. 1.2.3 we already discussed the original study on object unity by Kellman
and Spelke (1983) with the main result being that 4-month-old infants seem to be
able to perceive a united, complete rod as moving behind a block. On the other
hand, a similar study with newborn infants demonstrated that infants do not pos-
sess this ability from birth (Slater et al., 1990). Neonates behaved in the opposite
way as compared to 4-month-olds, i.e. they showed a preference for the \complete
rod" display. The authors concluded that newborn infants do not perceive the rod
pieces as connected but are nevertheless able to discriminate gure from ground,
otherwise they would not have shown any preference.40
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Figure 3.3: Left: input displays and design in modeling Experiment 1, compare
Fig. 1.1. Background (gray), foreground (black). In the \rod movement" condition
the rod starts on the left side of the display, moves to the right one pixel at a time,
disappears for one time step at the right edge and then comes back performing
the same motion to the left. The central part between the rod ends is never
visible. Right: dishabituation preferences of the model in Experiment 1 as a
function of pre-training time. The gray shaded areas denote the standard error
bars calculated on the basis of 25 simulations. The circle indicates where the \rod
movement" preference curve intersects 0.5 and the line through the circle denotes
a standard error bar indicating to which precision this value is known. Note that
this intersection is not where it seemingly should be according to the gure. See
Sect. 3.8.4 for explanation.
Since neonates behave in the opposite way as compared to 4-month-olds there
should be an age where infants undergo a transition period assuming that devel-
opment is continuous. Indeed, Johnson and N a~ nez (1995) provide evidence for
such a transition period: 2-month-olds were investigated with a similar rod &
block design and did not show any preference for either test display. Given the
evidence, it seems that the development of object unity perception is a continuous
process that operates in the rst 4 months of life.3.3 Perception of object unity 41
Modeling procedure
We modeled these studies by rst pre-training the network with dierent visual
stimuli as described above. In this way infants' visual experience prior to the study
is taken into account. By varying the length of the pre-training, infant behavior
at dierent ages can be modeled. After pre-training, the network is trained with
the habituation stimulus for 1000 time steps. By analogy to the original stimuli
in Fig. 1.1 the network is trained with the stimuli in Fig. 3.3. To be precise, the
network is trained with the \rod movement" stimulus and a copy of the network is
trained with the \baseline" stimulus. This corresponds to dierent infant groups
in the study. After habituation both test stimuli are presented to each copy of the
network and their preferences, P, are calculated as described in eq. (3.1).
E1: Results
Fig. 3.3 shows the network's preference as a function of pre-training time. The
network that is habituated to the \rod movement" display begins with a prefer-
ence for the \complete rod" display, undergoes a transition period at 115000 time
steps and nally develops a clear preference for the \broken rod" display while the
\baseline" network saturates at 0.5 roughly | no preference for either test display.
This is in agreement with the picture derived from the studies above (it should
be mentioned that the baseline condition in Fig. 1.1 was never actually tested by
Slater et al. (1990)).
Unaligned edges
There is also data on the case if the rod ends in Fig. 1.1, \rod movement" display,
are not aligned (Johnson and Aslin, 1996). In that case 4-month-old infants pre-
ferred the complete rod (in the nonrelatable case, i.e. edges could not be extended
to meet behind the occluder), i.e. infants seem to have interpreted the display as
disconnected. This data is captured by the model as well since rod ends that are
not aligned never occur during pre-training and therefore no correlated \comple-
tion" can be constructed by the network. This issue is beyond the scope of this42
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thesis though.
3.3.2 Unity perception for stationary objects
S2: Original study
Looking at the \rod movement" condition in Fig. 1.1 instantly creates the impres-
sion that even if the rod pieces don't move there is a complete rod behind a block.
Why is that the case? It seems that common motion is not the only cue that is
available to denote a single object. We see that the rod pieces are aligned, have
common color and shape. Kellman and Spelke (1983) also investigated whether
4-month-olds perceive the unity of a stationary rod behind a block. Fig. 3.4, E2,
shows the stimuli used in our model. They are analogous to those in the original
study (not shown, compare Fig. 1.1). Infants were separated into three groups,
one for each habituation display, respectively. After habituation each group was
shown the test stimuli | a stationary \complete rod" and a stationary \broken
rod".
In this study infants in the \rod occlusion" group did not discriminate between the
test stimuli and dishabituated to them equally strongly. Why did infants show this
behavior? Infants of the same age dishabituated clearly in the previous study with
a moving rod. They were able to separate gure from ground, otherwise infants
in the \complete rod control" group would have shown no preference. They were
also able to distinguish the test stimuli because infants in the \broken rod control"
group preferred the \complete rod".
S3: Original study
Another study with 4-month-olds was performed to clarify this issue, compare
Fig. 3.4, E3. This time infants in the \rod occlusion" group dishabituated more to
the \broken rod" test whereas the \rod pieces" group dishabituated more to the
\complete rod" test.3.3 Perception of object unity 43
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Figure 3.4: Left: input displays and design in Experiments 2, 3 and 4. Background
(gray), foreground (black). Right: posthabituation preferences of the model in
Experiments 2, 3 and 4. The gray shaded areas denote the standard error bars
calculated on the basis of 25 simulations. In the results of E5, circles indicate where
the corresponding preference curves intersect 0.5 and the lines through the circles
are the respective error bars indicating to which precision this value is known.
Note that these intersections are not where they seemingly should be according to
the gure. See Sect. 3.8.4 for explanation.44
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In the light of this evidence, how can the \no preference" result for a stationary
rod behind a block in Study 2 be interpreted? Suppose, infants perceive nothing
at all behind the block or they perceive a dierent object other than a complete
or a broken rod. If one of those hypotheses was true then the Study 3 should yield
a \no preference" result as well. As just mentioned, this is not the case | infants
prefer the \broken rod" in Study 3. Therefore, infants probably do perceive the
rod ends in the \rod occlusion" display of Study 2 but have no denite perception
of what is hidden.
Given the results of the last section, we know that 2-month-olds in the \rod move-
ment" group did not show any preference. Therefore, we conjectured that infants
at this age might be in a transition period for object unity perception. We hypoth-
esize that in the case of the stationary rod occlusion, 4-month-olds may undergo a
transition period as well since they do not show any preference. In the next study
we will nd an additional indication that this might be the case.
S4: Original study
In analogy to Fig. 3.4, E4, four groups of 4-month-old infants were assigned to
each of the conditions and were habituated to them, respectively (Kellman and
Spelke, 1983). After habituation the complete and broken rod stimuli were pre-
sented. Infants habituated to a moving rod were tested with moving rod displays
and the other infant groups were tested with stationary rod displays.
Interestingly, only infants in the \rod movement" group showed a preference. They
preferred the \broken rod" display which is consistent with the studies in the pre-
vious section. All other infant groups did not show any preference. Adults have
been investigated as well by asking them to judge the strength of their impression
of connectedness or disconnectedness of two visible parts of a display (Kellman and
Spelke, 1983). In all four displays adults perceived the rod pieces as connected be-
hind the block. Since adults perceive connectedness the \no preference" results can
only be restricted to a limited age range. In other words, the infants must be in a
transition period (assuming that the preference is a monotonic function of the age).3.3 Perception of object unity 45
Given that on the one hand, infants are in a transition period for the stationary
\no movement" display and on the other hand, they apparently have passed this
period for the \rod movement" display this study supports the conjecture that the
perception of object unity must be developing later for stationary rods as com-
pared to moving ones.
Modeling procedure
The procedure is the same as in the previous section. The habituation and test
stimuli are shown in Fig. 3.4.
E2: Results
In the \rod occlusion" case the development of the model's preference in Fig. 3.4,
E2, is similar to the one in Experiment 1. Comparing this result to the original
Study 2 we conclude that for a stationary rod & block display 4-month-olds must
be in a transition period.
As for the \complete rod control" case both data of 4-month-olds as well as adult
data (Kellman and Spelke, 1983) indicate a preference for the \broken rod" display.
This is consistent with the model's results as well. The \broken rod control" result
contradicts the experimental data since the Study 2 and adult data have shown
that both 4-month-old and adults seem to prefer the \complete rod" display. See
Sect. 3.5.3 for an explanation.
E3: Results
Similarly to the previous experiment the representation of a complete rod devel-
ops with time, Fig. 3.4, E3, \rod occlusion". As for the control condition (\rod
pieces"), the model keeps preferring the \complete rod" throughout development.
Both results are fully consistent with the results of Study 3 with 4-month-olds.
Unfortunately, there is no data for newborns and adults to compare. Therefore,
the model predicts that adults and newborns, people of all ages indeed, should46
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show a preference for the \complete rod".
E4: Results
Recall that only the \rod movement" group showed a preference for the \broken
rod" display in the original Study 4. All other groups did not show any preference.
On the other hand, adults interpret all of the habituation displays of Experiment 4
(see Fig. 3.4) as connected (Kellman and Spelke, 1983). Since adult data do not
correspond to infant data we must conclude that the behavior of 4-month-old in-
fants will change at some point later in development.
In Fig. 3.4, E4, we see the behavior of the model. For all conditions the preference
starts below 0.5, transitions 0.5 at some point and saturates at a higher level in the
end. Although the \rod movement" group does not undergo the transition before
all other groups as has been observed with infants, the data are consistent with
the observation that infants show no preference at some point (the area where the
preferences cross 0.5) and that adults perceive the rod pieces as connected in each
display.
This experiment conrms what we conjectured about moving vs. stationary rod
perception since the network in the \no movement" condition crosses 0.5 signif-
icantly later than in all other conditions (see transition points in the results of
E4, Fig. 3.4). Since there is only an indication from infant data that object unity
might develop later for stationary objects as compared to moving ones (Study 4),
the result of our model presents a prediction for future studies. See Experiment 5
for elaboration of this prediction and Sect. 3.5 for explanation.3.3 Perception of object unity 47
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Figure 3.5: Left: input displays and design in Experiment 5. Background (gray),
foreground (black). Right: posthabituation preferences of the model in Experi-
ment 5. The gray shaded areas denote the standard error bars calculated on the
basis of 25 simulations. Circles indicate where the corresponding preference curves
intersect 0.5 and the lines through the circles are the respective error bars indi-
cating to which precision this value is known. Note that these intersections are
not where they seemingly should be according to the gure. See Sect. 3.8.4 for
explanation.
3.3.3 Object unity perception behind occluders of varying
sizes
S5: Original study
Johnson and Aslin (1995) and Johnson and N a~ nez (1995) made an object unity
study just as in Study 1 but with 2-month-olds and stimuli presented on a 
at
computer screen (as opposed to the 3-dimensional stimuli in the original studies).
Johnson and N a~ nez (1995) used the same width of the occluder as Kellman and
Spelke (1983) but the 2-month-olds did not show any preference. This ts well to48
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the transition hypothesis formulated above. In another study (Johnson and Aslin,
1995) an occluder of half the width was presented and 2-month-olds did show a
preference for the broken rod. This indicates that this transition point depends
on the occluder width.
Modeling procedure
The modeling procedure is equal to Experiment 1 only that we now use the dis-
plays in Fig. 3.5 once in a moving rod condition and once in a stationary rod
condition.
E5: Results
Fig. 3.5 shows the development of the model's preferences. First, the thinner the
occluding block is the faster the model develops a perception of unity. Second, the
preferences in a stationary rod condition develop later than the preferences in the
corresponding moving rod condition.
The rst result is in agreement with Johnson and Aslin (1995) whereas the second
result makes the prediction that the perception of object unity should develop later
for stationary objects as opposed to moving ones.
3.4 Perception of occluded object trajectories and
object permanence
In the previous section we saw how the model explains how infants might learn to
perceive the unity of objects. In this section we show that the model also learns
to represent moving but temporarily invisible objects and thereby track their tra-
jectories.3.4 Perception of occluded object trajectories and object permanence 49
S6: Original studies
Figure 3.6: Design of the study. Infants were habituated with stimulus a) and
tested with alternating stimuli b) and c).
Inputs and design Results
E6: object
movement
habituation
display
test
displays
continuous discontinuous
Figure 3.7: Left: input displays and design in Experiment 6. Background (gray),
foreground (black). Right: posthabituation preferences of the model in Experi-
ment 6. The gray shaded areas denote the standard error bars calculated on the
basis of 25 simulations. Circles indicate where the corresponding preference curves
intersect 0.5 and the lines through the circles are the respective error bars indi-
cating to which precision this value is known. Note that these intersections are
not where they seemingly should be according to the gure. See Sect. 3.8.4 for
explanation.
Johnson et al. (2003) investigated whether and to what extent infants are able to
track object trajectories behind occluders. Infants were presented a screen with a50
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ball oscillating behind an occluder. The ball would start on the left, move behind
the rectangular occluder, reappear after some time at its right edge, move on, then
reverse its moving direction, disappear behind the occluder and reappear again,
see Fig. 3.6a).
Infant's interpretation of this habituation stimulus was measured by presenting
two test displays. The continuous display, Fig. 3.6b), showed the ball moving fully
visibly without being occluded at any point. The discontinuous display, Fig. 3.6c),
showed the ball moving back and forth exactly as during habituation but disap-
pearing at the locations where the occluder used to be.
The rationale behind this study was the following. If infants are able to track
the ball trajectory behind the occluder during habituation they would generalize
this to the continuous display and therefore dishabituate to the discontinuous dis-
play. If, on the other hand, the infants are not able to track the ball, they would
only habituate to the directly visible parts of the trajectory which are identical
to the discontinuous display. Thus, the infants would be more surprised to see
the continuous display and dishabituate more to it. In a separate control study
another group of infants was shown the test displays without prior habituation in
order to assess any possible intrinsic preference.
The results were that infants' looking patterns depend on their age and on the
width of the occluder. In case of a wide occluder 4-month-olds preferred the con-
tinuous display whereas 6-month-olds preferred the discontinuous one. Since the
control study ruled out any intrinsic preference, this result is consistent with the
interpretation that 4-month-olds are not able to track the ball behind the (wide)
occluder while 6-month-olds have developed this ability.
A second study has been performed with a narrow occluder where the 4-month-
olds suddenly preferred the discontinuous display. Thus, they were able to track
the ball behind a narrow occluder. In consequence, just making the occluder more
narrow allows infants to succeed in tracking. Maybe, in the case of the wide oc-
cluder, 4-month-olds partially succeeded in tracking the ball. In the same study
2-month-olds were habituated to a narrow occluder and did not show any pref-3.4 Perception of occluded object trajectories and object permanence 51
erence. This result might mean that the tracking ability of 2-month-olds is just
about to develop.
In a third study 4-month-olds were presented habituation displays with dier-
ent occluder widths. Consistently, the wider the occluder became, the more the
preference shifted towards the continuous display, i.e. the more dicult it seemed
for the infants to track the hidden ball.
In summary, object tracking and permanence | the ability to track and rep-
resent things that are hidden behind other objects | seems to develop gradually
in the rst year of life. Moreover, this ability seems to develop more slowly for wide
occluders as compared to narrow ones. This is plausible since objects disappear
for a longer time behind a wider occluder.3
Modeling procedure
We modeled these studies in the same way as the previous ones. Note that the
pre-training is never changed to adapt to these new input patterns. As habitu-
ation stimulus an object moving behind occluders of three dierent sizes is used
(see Fig. 3.7, only the occluder with intermediate width is shown).
E6: Results
Fig. 3.7 shows the development of the network's performance for three dierent
occluder widths. First note that for all widths the preferences grow above 0.5 at
some point, i.e. the point at which the network learns to represent the moving
hidden object. This point marks a qualitative change in the ability to represent
occluded objects and is reached at dierent times in development depending on
the width of the occluder. For the narrow occluder this point is reached rst and
it is reached last for the wide occluder.
3There is evidence that the width of an occluder and the time of disappearance expected by
infants are correlated since infants seem to be able to represent the velocity of the moving object
(von Hofsten et al., 2007).52
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Taken together this explains the pattern of data of all three studies. In Fig. 3.7
the rst study corresponds to the intersections 4 and 5 (4- and 6-month-olds were
presented a wide occluder). The second study corresponds to the intersections 1
and 2 (2- and 4-month-olds were presented a narrow occluder). And nally the
third study corresponds to the intersections 2, 3 and 4 (4-month-olds were pre-
sented occluders with three dierent widths). Thus, the observed pattern matches
the behavioral pattern of infants.
3.5 A unied account of the development of ob-
ject unity, object permanence, and occlusion
perception
The model provides a concrete picture of how the perception of object unity,
permanence, and tracking might develop.
3.5.1 Learning object unity
At the start of the pre-training the network has not developed any representations
yet. When presented with the habituation stimulus, it learns only what is directly
visible. Fig. 3.8 shows the mechanism for the case of the \rod movement" dis-
play in the object unity experiments. In the beginning of learning the background
hidden layer learns to represent the separate rod pieces (broken rod) and the fore-
ground hidden layer learns to represent the block. Since the network represents
the broken rod, it \dishabituates" only to the \complete rod" test display which
explains the behavior of newborn infants (Slater et al., 1990).
As pre-training proceeds, the network learns to represent a complete rod since
non-occluded, complete rods are abundant during pre-training. Specically, the
network learns that two rod pieces moving together are always correlated with the
presence of a connection between those pieces, i.e. a complete rod. This mech-
anism is similar to pattern completion in auto-encoder networks (Hertz et al.,3.5 A unied account of the development of object unity, object
permanence, and occlusion perception 53
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Figure 3.8: Object unity and permanence representation in the network
1991). Therefore, when presented two rod pieces moving together, the network
automatically retrieves the representation of the intermediate piece, i.e. it \lls
in" a complete rod, see \interpretation created by the hidden and context lay-
ers" in Fig. 3.8. At the same time the network learns to present a broken rod
at the output layer through \background suppression" (strong negative weights)
such that the output matches the input at the next time step (a broken rod)
while at the same time the background hidden layer represents a complete rod.
In the performance measurement, this representation is compared to test displays.
Therefore, the comparison to the broken rod leads to a greater dierence than the
comparison to the complete rod, i.e. the network \dishabituates" to the \broken54
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rod". Since learning is a continuous process in the network, there will also be a
transition period where the network shows no preference for either test display as
supported by experimental evidence (Johnson and N a~ nez, 1995). In that case, the
representation of a complete rod is only \half-built".
In the case of a thin occluder there is already a lot of rod surface directly vis-
ible. Therefore, there is a strong \correlation drive" in the background hidden
layer to \ll in" the missing part. On the other hand, if only little rod surface is
present then the correlation drive is weak and the area to be \lled in" is large.
Thus, it takes more learning time in order to develop a strong correlation drive for
thick occluders. That explains the slower learning for thicker occluders in Experi-
ment 5 as supported by Study 5.
If the visible surface is disrupted as in the \rod pieces" habituation display of
Experiment 3, the \lling in" of this gap is suppressed by the learning algorithm
during habituation. This is due to the fact that the correlation drive can \ll in"
only the occluded parts of the display, otherwise it would cause a prediction error
which leads to a suppression of the \lled in" gap. That is why the network always
represents just the rod pieces and therefore shows a preference for the complete
rod at all pre-training times explaining the results of Study 3.
In summary, the model learns to perceive object unity based on a statistical cor-
relation of the presence of object parts.
3.5.2 Learning object permanence and tracking
Similar to above, the network begins without any representation before the pre-
training. Therefore, when presented the habituation display in Fig. 3.7, it learns
only what is directly visible, which corresponds to the discontinuous test display.
This explains the model's preference for the continuous test display after small
pre-training times, explaining the results of Study 6 for young infants.
As pre-training proceeds, the network learns to represent a free, non-occluded mo-
tion since they are abundant during pre-training. When some background object3.5 A unied account of the development of object unity, object
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becomes occluded the background input layer becomes deprived of input. Since the
network is recurrent, it is the recurrent drive that ensures that the representation
is kept in the hidden layer for several time steps, which explains object perma-
nence. It also explains object tracking since the representation that is maintained
is not necessarily static but represents moving objects dynamically.
The recurrent drive can not represent an occluded object for an arbitrary amount
of time without being supported by direct input. The representation becomes
weaker with time until it is lost completely. This explains the occluder thickness
dependence of Study 6, since objects have to be tracked for several time steps if
the occluder is thick.
In summary, the model learns to track objects and to represent them behind
occluders because of the developing recurrent drive.
3.5.3 Role of edge congurations
Recall that the \broken rod control" result in Experiment 2 is not consistent with
the experimental data (Kellman and Spelke, 1983). 4-month-olds and adults both
seem to perceive a broken rod in front of a block, see Study 2. As for the model,
it represents the central part of the rod whenever two aligned rod pieces are pre-
sented. This is due to the fact that the model is not sensitive to edges, since in the
\rod occlusion" display the edges of the rod and the occluder form a T-junction
which is an important cue revealing the depth relation between the rod and the
occluder while the edge conguration in the \broken rod control" case indicates
that the rod pieces are in front of the occluder.
According to Kellman and Arterberry (1998), pp. 160{161, the sensitivity to edge
congurations (which they call edge-sensitive process) has not developed before
the rst 6 months of the infant's life. With regard to Study 2 this is probably not
the case. If the conguration of edges in the habituation displays was meaning-
less infants may treat the \rod occlusion" and the \broken rod control" displays
equally which is not supported by evidence. Therefore, this study presents a hint
that the edge conguration has some in
uence.56
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In our view, the picture that is most consistent with the data is the following.
Recall that 4-month-olds show no denite perception of the occluded part in the
\rod occlusion" display (Study 2). It is not possible that they just perceive the
directly visible rod ends because that would lead them to dishabituate more at
the \complete rod" display comparable to neonates' behavior. Therefore, direct,
uninterpreted perception always leads to the perception of a broken rod in these
displays, i.e. a denite empty space between the rod ends. As the infants did not
show any preference, they have probably taken into account the edges and inter-
preted the space between the rod ends as at least indenite, which is consistent
with the experimenters' conclusion. Thus, the consideration of the edge congu-
ration had the opposite in
uence on the looking behavior as compared to direct
perception which explains the \no preference" result. Considering the \broken
rod control" display both direct perception and the edge conguration may tell
the infant that the rod is broken, since the edge relations lead them to infer that
the rod pieces are indeed in front of the block. Therefore, the infants showed a
preference for the \complete rod".
Our model can not take into account edge congurations and therefore it is not
surprising that it treats the \rod occlusion" and the \broken rod control" simi-
larly. On the other hand, the model also demonstrates that the sensitivity to edge
congurations is not necessary for the interpretation of a complete rod even for
stationary displays. It seems only necessary for the inference of the correct depth
relations, at least for the object unity tasks.
3.5.4 Object perception of neonates?
Slater et al. (1990) conclude from their studies that (1) infants are able to segre-
gate gure from ground and (2) treat the two rod ends as separate objects. We
incorporated the rst conclusion as an assumption of our model. Regarding the
second conclusion, an alternative interpretation is simply that newborn infants
have direct, uninterpreted perception. This is how our network starts learning and
it is consistent with the result of the study since infants could just have habituated
to the directly perceived rod ends and then dishabituated to the complete rod.3.6 Predictions of the model 57
3.5.5 Object unity for stationary vs. moving objects
An analysis of the network reveals that during the habituation phase the represen-
tation of a \lled-in" complete rod behind an occluder tends to get erased. This is
due to the absence of the connection of the rod ends in the input and the continued
learning of the network during habituation which may erase the representation of
the connection in the background hidden layer, see Fig. 3.8. This eect is much
stronger for a stationary rod than for a moving one due to the fact that for a
moving rod the connection moves as well, i.e. it appears at many positions. Since
it is harder to erase a representation that has been built up at many positions as
compared to the representation at only one position the representation of a moving
rod turns out to be more stable. Consequently, it takes more time for the network
to develop a stable representation of a stationary occluded rod which explains its
behavior in Experiment 5.
This result constitutes a prediction of our model that the perception of object
unity develops later for stationary objects as compared to moving ones. This as-
sumes though, that infants do not track the occluded object smoothly, otherwise
the moving rod would appear stationary in eye-centered coordinates and not dier
from a stationary rod. This possibility is unlikely though as suggested by experi-
mental data. For example, in an object tracking study von Hofsten et al. (2007)
observed that \none of the [ten 4-month-old] infants persued the object smoothly
over the occluder", p. 636, and \the gaze stopped at the occluder edge until making
saccadic shift(s) over to the other side", p. 632.
3.6 Predictions of the model
A good model should not only be able to explain experimental data but also make
specic and testable predictions, i.e. it must be falsiable. In the following section
all predictions of our model are summarized.
1. The main prediction of the model is that infants can learn the perception of
object unity, permanence, and tracking. Specically, the model predicts that58
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visual preferences of infants at dierent ages are a result of their visual expe-
rience. By changing the amount and structure of their visual input one can
alter their visual processing. Specically, the natural development of pref-
erences might be accelerated, slowed down or even reversed. For example,
2-month-olds who did not show any preference after the \rod movement"
habituation, see Study 1, could be taught to develop a preference for the
\complete rod" display | the way neonates behave | by presenting them
disconnected objects in common motion. It is also conceivable that infants
growing up in a world governed by dierent statistics than our world might
not learn object unity at all, e.g. they might learn that parts that move to-
gether actually belong to dierent objects and vice versa.
2. The perception of object unity develops later for stationary occluded objects
as compared to moving ones, see Experiment 5.
3. Slater et al. (1990) concluded that neonates interpret the \rod movement"
display in Fig. 1.1 as two separate rod pieces. In contrast, our model predicts
that newborn infants do not perceive objects at all (see Sect. 3.5.4) which
is also in agreement with the studies of Slater et al. (1990). Specically,
neonates only have an uninterpreted, bottom-up perception of the display.
4. The perception of object unity is corrupted if there is a visible gap between
the object part and the occluder, see \rod pieces" display in Experiment 3,
Fig. 3.4. Kellman and Spelke (1983) have shown that already for 4-month-
olds but according to our results (Experiment 3), the model predicts that it
should hold true for all ages.
5. Graded dishabituation time: The dishabituation time depends on the amount
of surface in the test display that matched the expected surface. For exam-
ple, if in Experiment 1 the \broken rod" display had shown more rod surface
(if the gap between the rod ends had been smaller), then infants who already
perceive unity will dishabituate less to it as compared to the display with a3.7 Discussion 59
larger gap.
3.7 Discussion
We presented a model that can explain a broad range of infant studies (12 studies
in total from three dierent laboratories). The guiding principle for learning is
the prediction of future inputs (Elman, 1990). The network is able to learn to
represent the unity of objects as well as object permanence and tracking behind
occluders thereby providing a unifying account of these dierent event categories.
The model specically explains the gradual development of these abilities, encom-
passing the behavior from newborn infants to adults. It also accounts for specic
eects like the role of the width of occluders and dierences in the perception of
moving vs. stationary objects. Finally, the model demonstrated that these abilities
can be acquired through learning and made predictions about future experiments.
3.7.1 Related modeling work
Schlesinger and Young (2003) used a prediction network for modeling tracking
of objects behind occluders (Baillargeon, 1986). It was presented stimuli similar
to the original infant studies but they did not pre-train their network which we
consider essential in this kind of modeling (see Sect. 3.2.2 for details). It is impor-
tant since infant behavior undergoes qualitative changes during development and
therefore every developmental model needs to be able to model the developmental
processes that give rise to dierent competence levels at dierent ages. Therefore,
we have to provide the model with some age dependent pre-experimental experi-
ence which we accomplish by pre-training our network.
To our knowledge, the rst attempt to analogize the error in neural networks
to infant looking time has been made by Mareschal et al. (2000). We adopted a
modied version of the network error that is suitable for our network structure
comparing the representations by the background and foreground hidden layers
with the inputs as dened in Sect. 3.8.2.60
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Mareschal et al. (1999) trained a network to predict occlusion events but the
network comprises specialized modules trained dierently for their specic tasks
(e.g. an object recognition module) which makes it less parsimonious than our
model. Also, the trajectory prediction module learns to predict the position of
a specic object which is only a subset of the whole retinal input (that includes
the occluding screen as well). That makes the model less general and dicult to
extend to additional studies.
Similarly to our model Munakata et al. (1997) trained a simple recurrent network
to build representations of occluded objects but their model was trained exactly
for the one task is was supposed to accomplish: representing an occluded object
at a xed position whereas in our model neither the position of the objects nor
their size nor the sort of task is pre-specied.
An important predecessor of this model is the work done by Mareschal and Johnson
(2002) on object unity perception who presented a neural network model success-
fully explaining how the perception of object unity may be learned. Our model
extends and compliments this line of work in several respects. First, we provide
a more detailed modeling of the actual experimental studies on object unity. Sec-
ond, Munakata and Stedron (2002) pointed out that a potential shortcoming is the
usage of a supervised target signal training the network's response to classify each
input as \single object", \two disjoint objects" or \intermediate" which begs the
question of whether such a target signal is available to infants. Our work addresses
this question by extracting the target output directly from the environment. This
constitutes a generic principle of prediction of future inputs (Elman, 1990) that is
supported by neuroscientic evidence (Rao and Ballard, 1999). Third, our generic
target output allows for modeling the habituation paradigm more closely which al-
lows the construction of modeling variables (dishabituation error) that correspond
to actually measured looking time in habituation studies. Fourth, although the
construction of a number of pre-programmed task-specic modules was carefully
justied by the existence of corresponding innate abilities in infancy, our model
uses fewer such assumptions and predened programming. Together with our
generic target signal it makes our model more extendable and generalizable which3.7 Discussion 61
is attested by its ability to account for additional visual events beyond object unity
such as the perception of object permanence and occluded object trajectories.
Finally, the main dierence to all previous work is that we presented a unied
model that can account for infant behavior in several domains, not only in the
domain of object unity. We consider this as major strength in modeling work
specically because such models are likely to reveal general principles that guide
development. We are condent that we will be able to extend the model to rep-
resent even more visual events, like launching (already successful, see Chapter 2),
blocked motion, gravity and support, continuity of object motion, object identity
(see discussion of future work below). Up to now, technical reasons hinder us from
doing so (long training times for large networks trained with backpropagation of
error, convergence to local minima of the error landscape).
3.7.2 Nativist perspectives
Our model provides a mostly empiricist account of the development of object unity
and permanence. The only major assumption that we made is that a simple form
of gure-ground segregation is present at birth, which is supported by experimen-
tal evidence (Slater et al., 1990). Many of the modeled studies are regarded as
evidence for innate capacities though (Kellman and Arterberry, 1998, Spelke, 1990,
1994) which is questionable in our view. As argued by Spencer et al. (2009) \na-
tivists routinely extrapolate well beyond the data, making bold claims about time
points not directly under investigation. For instance, Marcus (2001) described a
habituation study with 4-month-olds, concluding `it seems likely that at least some
of the machinery that infants use in this task is innate' (p. 370), but he presents no
evidence to support this claim." In our case, Spelke extrapolates similarly beyond
the data for 4-month-olds in order to support claims about innateness although
four months are more than enough time for learning given that infants are able to
learn eectively even within two minutes (Saran et al., 1996).
As for object unity perception, Kellman and Arterberry (1998), pp. 158{160, ar-
gue that there are unlearned foundations. Since there is a clear development in
the perception of object unity taking place between birth and four months of age62
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they postulate the existence of the edge-insensitive process, which is supposed to
be responsible for the detection of common motion, and that maturates at the age
of two months. Moreover, they argue that given the evidence that newborns seem
to perceive the rod ends as separate objects (Slater et al., 1990), the perception
of object unity could not be learned because it would force infants to start with
a wrong perceptual rule, e.g. \things that translate rigidly are separate". If the
learning account was true, a learning process would need to overwrite this rule
which they consider as implausible.
Although we agree that this particular learning account is implausible there is
no evidence that there should be a perceptual rule for newborns. Neonates could
just have uninterpreted perception. In fact, our model demonstrates that it is pos-
sible to start with uninterpreted perception, apply a learning algorithm to it and
learn to perceive object unity without the assumptions that Kellman and Arter-
berry (1998) considered necessary. Apart from that our learning account is more
parsimonious since it does not assume a special-purpose edge-insensitive process
with an arbitrary time of onset.
More general arguments have been put forward by Spelke (1990, 1994). According
to this view initial core principles such as perception of object unity could not be
learned because \learning systems require perceptual systems that parse the world
appropriately" (Spelke, 1994), p. 439, i.e. if the perceptual systems can not parse
the world appropriately into objects then no learning about object properties could
be possible. Spelke assumes that in order to learn one needs to be able to reason
about some entities. Therefore, those entities need to be present before learning
can start. Gestalt psychologists refer to this as the paradox of the \experience
error" (Spelke, 1990). In contrast to these considerations, our model demonstrates
that learning is possible without those entities (like objects). In the end, the model
learns almost from scratch and arrives at the same capacities that infants develop.3.7 Discussion 63
3.7.3 Limitations of the model and future work
The main limitation of the model is of a technical nature: since learning in such
a large network is dicult with backpropagation of error, the range of possible
training sequences had to be limited, e.g. the rod could only have width equal to
1 and be vertically centered in the display, see Sect. 3.2.2 for a full description.
If the network did not have these constraints, we could have just trained it with
rectangles with random heights and widths that move around and occlude each
other once in a while. In an earlier version of the model this approach was already
successful but it had biologically implausible and somewhat arbitrary construc-
tions that made that model less parsimonious.
Another limitation is that we are not able to explain all occlusion data. Espe-
cially, data reviewed by Baillargeon (1999) poses a great challenge. Specically,
it is not clear why the behavior of infants seems to depend on whether the parts
of the occluding screen are connected or what is the role of the size of occluded
objects. Some of the reviewed data indicates that infants might rst acquire a
general behind/not behind distinction and later in development add more details
to these concepts. This kind of data cannot be explained within the current frame-
work and will be discussed in the next chapter.
Another interesting topic would be using this framework to account for dier-
ent event categories. The framework is suitable for these challenges since it is not
constructed specically for the object unity or occlusion tasks. In Chapter 2 we
have already demonstrated that a model of this type is able to represent both
occlusion and launching events. Therefore, except for technical reasons the exten-
sion to launching is straightforward in our model. If launching is possible then
visual events such as blocked motion, motion continuity, object identity, gravity
and support and even containment are also conceivable. There is a huge amount
of experimental data available on these topics and much of it may be explainable
by the present framework. It denitely poses a great and exciting challenge for
future work.64
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3.8 Model details and equations
3.8.1 Calculating the neuron activities
The network consisted of Nz = 776 = 294 input and output units, respectively.
Each hidden and context layer had 50 units. According to Fig. 3.1 the network
calculated its activity in the following way. The hidden layer activities, ~ Y 1(t) and
~ Y 2(t), resulted from
~ Y
k(t) = s

V
k ~ X
k(t) + U
k ~ Y
k(t   1)

; (3.2)
where k 2 f1;2g, V k and Uk are weight matrices and s is the sigmoid
s(x) = (1 + e
 x)
 1: (3.3)
The output, ~ Z(t), is calculated accordingly:
~ Z(t) = s

W
1 ~ Y
1(t) + W
2 ~ Y
2(t)

; (3.4)
with the W k being weight matrices to the output layer.
3.8.2 Learning: backpropagation through time
The network in Fig. 3.1 is dened by the equations in the previous section. We
used the backpropagation though time algorithm (Hertz et al., 1991) that reduces
the squared dierence between the output vector, ~ Z(t), and the next input vector,
~ X(t + 1):
E(t) =
1
2
Nz X
i=1
(Zi(t)   Xi(t + 1))
2: (3.5)
We want to know how the connection weights Uk
mn have to change in order to
reduce the objective function (3.5), for those are the weights that are involved in
the recurrent calculations. Since the calculation for U1
mn and U2
mn is the same, we
will treat them as the same in the calculation and omit the index k. The gradient3.8 Model details and equations 65
of the objective function is
@E(t)
@Umn
=
X
i
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@Zi(t)
@Umn
: (3.6)
From (3.4) and (3.2) it follows
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Expanding the last term leads to
Qmn = Ym(t   1) +
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: (3.8)
Of course this expanding never ends since we are in a loop and can in principle go
innitely back in time. Practically, we must cancel the second term in the square
bracket. Canceling this term in eq. (3.7) leads to the simple Elman network (El-
man, 1990) that does not involve backpropagation through time. Canceling this
term in eq. (3.8) leads to going back one step in time. This change improved the
network's performance considerably.
After calculating the gradient, at each time step we changed the weights, Unm,
using eq. (3.6):
Unm =  
@E(t)
@Unm
: (3.9)
3.8.3 Performance measurement in the network
In analogy to what might happen in infants we compare the networks represen-
tation of a e.g. complete rod during habituation to the test displays. In order66
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to do so we have to retrieve this information from the hidden layers. In Fig. 3.8
this representation is described as \interpretation created by hidden and context
layers". This \interpretation" can be calculated by
~ Z
1
int(t) = s

W
1 ~ Y
1(t)

(3.10)
in the case of the background hidden layer. Note that in comparison to the real
output calculation, eq. (3.4), the in
uence of the foreground hidden layer W 2~ Y 2(t)
is omitted. Given the networks \interpreted" output, ~ Z1
int(t), how can its perfor-
mance be measured and related to an infant's looking time? For this purpose, the
dierence between the \interpreted" output during habituation with the actual
inputs, ~ X(1)(t) and ~ X(2)(t), during the tests, has been computed. This results in
what we call the dishabituation error, in analogy to the dishabituation time:
Ek 
2 X
a=1
1
T
T X
t=1
Nz X
i=1
  Z
a
i, int(t)   X
(k)
i (t)
  ; (3.11)
where ~ Z2
int(t) is given by
~ Z
2
int(t) = s

W
2 ~ Y
2(t)

; (3.12)
analogously to (3.10) and T = 16 is the duration of each trial. After computing
these entities we obtain the model's preference using (3.1). Note that the whole
network is symmetric and the performance measurement is also symmetric in the
foreground and background calculations.
3.8.4 Calculating points of intersection and the respective
error bars
In the results of Fig. 3.7, for example, the intersection points of the preference
curves with 0.5 had to be calculated. In order to judge whether two preference
curves cross 0.5 at signicantly dierent times, an estimation of the mean point of
intersection and the corresponding standard errors are necessary. For this purpose,
a 6th grade polynomial is tted to a preference curve and the intersection point3.8 Model details and equations 67
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Figure 3.9: Illustration of the calculation of intersection points. The preference
curves shown are part of the real data.
of the polynomial with 0.5 is calculated. 5th grade polynomials have been tried
as well which did not make any dierence in the results. Subsequently, the mean
and standard error of the set of those intersection points could be calculated. This
resulted in the means and error bars in Fig. 3.7.
Fig. 3.9 shows how the intersection points are calculated. Specically, note that the
intersection of the mean curve with 0.5 is dierent from the mean of the intersec-
tion points. At rst glance this might seem surprising but for each set of non-linear
curves this is not avoidable because the distribution of intersection points depends
strongly on the shape of the curves.68
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Chapter 4
Evaluation of progress
How should the progress made by the models be evaluated? Initially, the work was
motivated by nding and modeling the rst steps in the development of cognition.
Specically, we set the goal of modeling how infants segregate the world according
to the role that its entities play in it. One starting point was the animate vs. inan-
imate distinction occurring early in life and proposedly based on the perception of
self-propelled vs. caused motion.
Modeling the study by Leslie (1982) seemed like a prospective project to embark
on this problem since it included caused motion (the \direct launching" condition)
and self-propelled motion (the \no prior movement" condition). Since the model
was trained to represent and predict launching scenarios it was not surprising that
self-propelled motion caused a higher prediction error than caused motion. This
fact alone may guide us to the conclusion that the model has learned the animate
vs. inanimate distinction in a primitive sense. Such conclusions should be taken
with care though as will be discussed below.
Intuitively, we as adults have the impression that there is some categorical dif-
ference between caused motion and self-propelled motion. It is important to ask:
what is the nature of the prediction error made by the model in the \no prior
movement" test? The model predicts the second block to stay immobile since it is
not pushed by the rst block. But, contrary to this prediction, it does move and
causes a prediction error at two pixels: (1) at the pixel where it was expected to70 Evaluation of progress
stay, but where it did not stay and (2) at the pixel where it was not expected to
arrive but where it did arrive. Thus, the error's magnitude is two pixels, i.e. the
error depends on the resolution of the model. Generally, our criticism aims to show
that the prediction error will depend on many characteristics, e.g. the resolution,
the form, size and velocity of the involved objects etc. Therefore, it would be pre-
mature to conclude that the model has acquired the distinction between animate
vs. inanimate. In other words, it is able to show smoothly varying prediction
errors but it has not acquired a categorical distinction between self-propelled and
caused motion. In the following, we will elaborate on this rst intuition, showing
that the model on object unity and occlusion suers from this problem as well.
Specically, we will discuss a set of experimental data supporting our intuition and
which can not be captured by the discussed models even in principle. This will
lead the discussion of the question that maybe, something important is missing.
4.1 Challenging data
4.1.1 Object unity
The general rationale behind the object unity studies discussed above is the fol-
lowing. If infants represent a partly occluded rod as connected they should be
surprised seeing them disconnected in the test phase. Although these results and
its development during infancy have been modeled successfully in the previous
chapter, it would be premature to conclude that the model is able to represent
unity or connectedness as such. Intuitively, the notion of connectedness or unity
does not vary with the distance that separates the parts of an object. Placing
pieces of an object, like the two rod ends, more distant from each other, does
not make them more disconnected. The rod still is disconnected even if the gap
between the two rod ends is very small. Intuitively, infants should react to the con-
nectedness rather than to the size of the gap because only the strict connectedness
of two rod ends makes their correlated motion likely. We suspect that infants' un-
derstanding of this issue makes them behave in the observed way. Specically, we
conjecture that prediction 5 (suggesting that infants' dishabitation time depends4.1 Challenging data 71
Figure 4.1: Displays and design in Experiment 6 by Kellman and Spelke (1983).
on the size of this very gap) may be wrong. Experiment 6 in Kellman and Spelke
(1983) supports this conjecture. In this study the lower rod end was replaced
by an irregularly shaped polygon that moved coherently with the upper rod end
(Fig. 4.1). Although never exposed to such stimuli infants readily dishabituated
when presented the rod end as disconnected with the polygon. This study has
turned to be dicult to account for in our model since the representation of unity
or connectedness relies heavily on the model's previous experience (pre-training)
with unoccluded objects that would reoccur occluded in the experiments. Since a
polygon never occurred during pre-training the model generally \dishabituated"
with this stimulus. In a nutshell, previous experience seems to be important in
order to generally grasp that parts moving together are usually connected while
abstracting away from specic forms and features. Similarly, one could argue that
the model for causality is essentially on the right track, it just did not succeed in72 Evaluation of progress
abstracting away from the specic forms of the blocks, the resolution, velocities etc.
Despite the attractiveness of this view, we have to recall the experimental data dis-
cussed in the introduction. There, infant studies indicated that global categories
are formed rst and only later the categories are subdivided into more specic and
detailed subsets. The process is not a process of abstracting away from specic to
general, from ne to coarse, but one from general to specic, from coarse to ne.
In this context, it is fruitful to discuss some more data concerning these issues.
4.1.2 Baillargeon's data on causality, occlusion, support
and containment
Figure 4.2: Stimuli in Baillargeon's studies on causality, occlusion, support and
containment.
In her review papers (Baillargeon, 1994, 1999) Ren ee Baillargeon discusses a wide
range of experimental data that support the coarse-to-ne hypothesis for the per-
ception of events (rather than just the development of categorization that we
discussed in the introduction). It is not possible to go into detail of these studies
here but we summarize the main results.
In the case of launching and causality, infants at the age of already 2.5 months4.1 Challenging data 73
can judge that an object will only move when launched by another object and
that it will not do so when not caused to (Fig. 4.2, launching/causality). On the
contrary, not until around 6 months they start to understand the role of the sizes
of the objects and how they in
uence the velocity and trajectory of the objects. It
seems that infants rst acquire a launched/not launched distinction and only later
are able to judge the details of the scenario.
In the case of occlusion it was observed that at the age of 2.5 months infants disha-
bituate if a mouse moving behind two parallel bars does not occur between them
but they do not dishabituate if those bars are connected by a thin bar (Fig. 4.2,
occlusion). In other words, infants at 2.5 months readily detect occlusion viola-
tions with two parallel bars but they fail to do so when presented a U-shaped
object even though the mouse should be visible in the interior area of the \U".
Only around 3.5 months they detect the occlusion violation for the U-shaped ob-
ject. Baillargeon suggests that infants acquire rst a behind/not behind distinction
leading them to expect the mouse being hidden when behind the U-shaped object.
Only later they learn to adjust their expectations to the shape of the object as well.
Of course, there is more to event perception than we could cover in this thesis.
Specically, support and containment are among the most studied events in object
perception. As for support events, Baillargeon (1999) studied how the perception
of objects supporting each other develops. As shown in Fig. 4.2, support, infants
at the age of 3 months seem to consider mere contact of two objects sucient for
support as they are not surprised when the object is in contact with the side of
another object while they are surprised to see an object supported without con-
tact. As infants grow older (5 months) mere contact does not seem to be sucient
for support any more but contact at the upper surface does the job even though
the contact surface may not be large enough. Only by 6.5 months infants learn
to be sensitive to the amount of contact surface and by 12.5 months they succeed
in judging the weight distribution of the supported surface. This data suggests
that the perception of support starts also with a binary contact/no contact dis-
tinction and gets rened later, analogously to previously discussed event categories.
As for the perception of containment experimental data revealed that only at74 Evaluation of progress
the age of around 6-7 months infants start to consider the width and the height of
an object that is lowered into a container, e.g. that a tall object cannot be lowered
into a small container (Hespos and Baillargeon, 2001), see Fig. 4.2, containment.
On the other hand, 3-month-olds are already sensitive to whether the container is
opened or closed, e.g. that objects cannot be put into a closed container. Again,
it seems that infants rst acquire a binary opened/closed distinction before they
consider the role of detailed parameter relations.
Looking back at object unity data by Kellman and Spelke (1983) in the light
of this data it seems that infants have grasped that connectedness is essential for
object unity, i.e. they acquired a connected/disconnected distinction early in their
development.
Taken together, the data suggests that infants initially start with understanding
something like the \essence" of an event. They start to understand that something
is launched to move but not yet how far it will move. They understand that an
object is behind another but not yet where or how much of it is occluded. They
understand that there is contact but not yet where and how much of contact is
necessary for support. Finally, they understand that two parts are connected but
not how precisely they are connected. Looking at this data, it seems that infants
somehow succeed at grasping the \essence" of an event rst while leaving out all
the unimportant details. How could they arrive at this knowledge?
Given the discussed data it looks like infants are able to distinguish features of an
event and learn them step by step. For example, in the case of causality they rst
learn a launched/not launched distinction and only later consider the sizes of the
objects involved. In all cases it seems that infants rst grasp the essential feature
of the event (whatever that means) and later add more and more features to the
phenomenon.4.1 Challenging data 75
4.1.3 Comparison to model performance
Comparing that to our models leads to the observation that the models behave
dierently. For example, in no training phase does the model in the last chapter
acquire a connected/disconnected distinction with disregard to the object shape
even though the model has been trained with rectangles of various sizes. Nowhere
in the hidden units there is a representation of a connected/united object. Similar
criticism applies to the representations of occlusion and causality.
Despite the successes of the models in explaining a wide range of data, the previ-
ous discussion leads to the conclusion that something important may be missing.
How is it possible to build a model that develops representations of the events in
a featurewise fashion? Specically, how is it possible to extract such features of
the visual input in an unsupervised way? Note that nobody tells infants to rst
extract the \unity"-feature of objects. The model achieves that by learning cor-
relations of inputs when they occur unoccluded but these correlations are dened
by the shape of the object that the model is trained with. Thus, there is no shape
or size independence of the unity representation.
This issue in itself does not pose a substantial problem but it indicates that it
is part of bigger problem: the object representation is not divided in several fea-
tures that are acquired step by step in development. For example, the movement
of rods of dierent lengths are learned together in the model although it may be
more ecient to possess a representation of say \left motion" combined with the
representation of \rod of length x". As research indicates (Baillargeon, 1999) in-
fants acquire the various variables like \rod length" separately from other features.
This leads us to the important question: How do infants know what features
to extract? Obviously, once the features are given it is possible to build eective
representations of stimuli, e.g. representing the length of a rod separately from its
position. The crucial question is not how to extract those features once they are
known but how to nd them.76 Evaluation of progress
4.2 Conclusion and further steps
There is a lot of material on feature extraction in the machine learning literature.
One path for further research may be nding a mathematical structure for feature
extraction and continue to model the featurewise development of event perception
in infancy. Although this procedure promises to be fruitful in explaining more
experimental data, it does not answer the question how infants extract those fea-
tures, why they prefer extracting them over some other features and why some
features are extracted later than others. Intuitively, it seems that infants extract
the \essential" features rst as has been argued above but we still do not know
why some features are preferred over others and what \essential" means precisely.
In order to answer these questions it seems necessary to investigate how infants
generally begin to grasp regularities in the environment. How do infants come
up with ideas about anything at all? Be it an eective representation of unity or
launching or anything else. One of the research guidelines of this thesis includes
staying very close to experimental data. Therefore, it was decided to study very
basic mechanisms of how infants begin to understand regularities and structure
in their visual environment. The last chapter will deal with these questions and
model how infants generally may form expectations based on their understanding
of a visual scene.77
Chapter 5
Development of visual
expectations and sequence
learning
5.1 Introduction
The formation of visual expectations is important for infants' understanding of
spatiotemporal events, planning and predicting sequences of actions, an indicator
for information processing and even a predictor for adult IQ (Haith et al., 1988,
Caneld et al., 1997, Benson et al., 1993, DiLalla et al., 1990). It is usually stud-
ied by the Visual Expectation Paradigm (VExP, Haith et al., 1988) where infants
are presented left and right appearing image sequences while eye movement reac-
tion time is measured and classied as anticipatory or reactive. Numerous studies
have shown that even young infants are able to form visual expectations revealed
by a drop in reaction time and higher probability of anticipatory eye movements
toward upcoming stimuli (Caneld et al., 1997, Wentworth and Haith, 1998, Ja-
cobson et al., 1992). Moreover, studies with more complex stimulus sequences
have revealed that infants can cope even with sequences requiring the ability to
enumerate repeatedly displayed stimuli at the same position (Caneld and Haith,
1991, Caneld and Smith, 1996, Rose et al., 2002, Reznick et al., 2000).
Despite these results it is unclear why infants' reaction time drops in the course78 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
of a session (Haith et al., 1988, Wentworth and Haith, 1998) and of development
(Caneld et al., 1997, Rose et al., 2002). Furthermore, why infants perform an-
ticipatory eye movements at all remains a topic of controversy and speculation.
For example, Haith et al. (1988) speculate that this behavior \serves to maintain
continuity in an ever-changing perceptual world" or \give[s] rise to more cogni-
tively based planning skills". Caneld and Haith (1991) suggest that an infant
tries to \gain internal control over its behavior, with the result that actions can
be executed more smoothly and stably in a complex and changing environment".
Already Piaget noted that \... this anticipatory function ... is to be found over
and over again at every level of the cognitive mechanisms and at the very heart
of the most elementary habits, even of perception" (Piaget, 1971, p. 19). Despite
the importance of this phenomenon there exist only vague speculations about the
origins of the observed behavior and a universally accepted theoretical account is
still lacking. Specically, this phenomenon connects to the question posed in the
last chapter: how do infants start to grasp simple regularities in the environment
such as a sequence of alternating images?
In this section we address this issue and propose a theory for the development
of visual expectations in infancy. We show that the theory accounts for a wide
set of experimental data. In essence, the theory suggests that infants strive to
maximize their looking time at each interesting stimulus, which is only possible if
the structure of the sequence is understood.
In order to formulate the theory more precisely we implement it as a computa-
tional model - a recurrent neural network model developed by Lazar et al. (2009)
that forms internal representations of input sequences. We proceed by extend-
ing it by a reinforcement learning architecture that learns to perform anticipatory
eye movements. In contrast to classical neural network modelling approaches our
model uses local learning rules and contains several biologically plausible elements
like excitatory and inhibitory spiking neurons, spike-timing dependent plasticity
(STDP), intrinsic plasticity (IP) and synaptic scaling.
The model allows us to account for twelve experimental studies on visual ex-
pectations from four dierent laboratories. Furthermore, it is shown how infants'5.2 Review of experimental data 79
internal representations can change even if the input remains stationary, which
allows infants to enumerate repeated occurrences of the same stimulus and to pre-
dict its shift to a dierent position successfully. In this way our model sheds fresh
light on (sequential) subitizing processes in infancy. It also makes new predictions
for future studies, e.g. that relearning of a sequence should happen faster than
learning it for the rst time.
5.2 Review of experimental data
Figure 5.1: Left: saccade latencies in a Visual Expectations Paradigm. Right:
Experimental design of VExP studies. Adopted from Caneld et al. (1997).
The Visual Expectation Paradigm (VExP) developed by Haith and his colleagues
(Haith et al., 1988) permits to study how infants use spatiotemporal regularity
to forecast upcoming events. Infants watch brief sequences of computer-generated
pictures that are either regular (e.g. pictures appear in a deterministic fashion on
the left and right sides of the monitor) or irregular (see Fig. 5.1, right). After each
onset of a stimulus the reaction time is measured, dened as the time dierence
between the beginning of a gaze shift towards the stimulus and its appearance on
the stimulus. A gaze shift is usually classied as anticipatory if it began after the80 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
oset of the previous stimulus and before 200 ms after the onset of the subsequent
stimulus taking into account that infants are estimated to require at least 200 ms
for a reaction (compare Fig. 5.1, left). In this way the percentage of anticipatory
saccades is calculated.
In this section we review general experimental results that ask for explanations.
They can be summarized in the following way.
1. For regular sequences, with increasing age and trial number,
a) the reaction time decreases,
b) the probability of correct anticipations increases while the probability of
wrong anticipations decreases.
For the left-right (LR), left-left-right (LLR) and left-left-left-right (LLLR) se-
quences,
2. as sequences get more complex1
a) the reaction time increases
b) the dierences between reaction times toward sequences of dierent com-
plexity increases with age,
c) the probability of correct anticipatory gaze shifts to the right decreases,
3. the probability of an anticipatory gaze shift to the right increases with each
presentation of a left stimulus.
For the so-called pivot sequence (left-top-left-bottom, see below),
4. the probability of correct anticipations is higher for the pivot stimulus (left)
than for either of the wing stimuli (top and bottom).
1\complexity" refers to the length of the sequence in this case.5.2 Review of experimental data 81
Result 1) has been observed both as an age eect and as a within-study eect.
The fact that the reaction time decreases as infants grow older (1a) is strongly
supported by a number of both longitudinal and cross-sectional studies (Caneld
et al., 1997, Reznick et al., 2000, Rose et al., 2002, Caneld et al., 1995, Jacobson
et al., 1992). One part of the explanation is certainly that infants' reaction time
generally decreases with age even for unpredictable sequences. In spite of that a
number of studies succeeded in proving that infants actually develop spatiotempo-
ral expectations in the course of the study, see e.g. Wentworth and Haith (1998),
Haith et al. (1988), observing a decrease in reaction time with the number of trials.
These results are consistent with the interpretation that infants learn to represent
spatiotemporal sequences.
As for result 1b), Caneld and Haith (1991) observed that 3-month-olds are more
likely to perform an anticipatory gaze shift from the rst/second/third L to R
(in the LR, LLR and LLLR sequences, respectively) and from R back to L than
2-month-olds. Rose et al. (2002) observed that the percentage of anticipations
in the RRL sequence increased signicantly from 15.7% (5-month-olds) to 16.9%
(7-month-olds) to 24.5% (12-month-olds). Consistent results hold for left-right al-
ternating studies (Reznick et al., 2000, Jacobson et al., 1992).
Result 2a) was obtained by Caneld and Haith (1991), Fig. 3 who observed a linear
increase in reaction time of 3-month-olds as the sequences changed from LR, LLR,
LLLR to IR (irregular). Additionally, this eect is smaller for younger infants
(2-month-olds) (2b). In the same study the authors observed that the probability
of anticipating the right stimulus decreased for more complex sequences (2c).
Result 3) was obtained by Caneld and Haith (1991) and Caneld and Smith
(1996) who found that the probability to shift the gaze to the right increases
with each presentation of a left stimulus in the LLR and LLLR sequences. It was
concluded that infants form number-based expectations related to enumeration
processes.
Reznick et al. (2000) studied a sequence where the stimuli can occur at three
possible positions: left (L), top (T) and bottom (B). The stimuli were displayed82 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
in a deterministic manner: L-T-L-B-L-T-L-B.... Apart from the results already
stated the authors observed that the probability of an anticipatory gaze shift to-
ward that pivot stimulus was almost twice as high as toward either wing stimulus
(result 4) for all ages tested (6-, 9- and 12-month-olds).
What all these studies have in common is the lack of a unied explanation for
their results although specic speculations about the underlying reasons for the
results are discussed. In our view, this explanation together with the observed
results constitute the requirements for a good theory of visual expectations in in-
fancy.
5.3 A theory of visual expectations
Our theory is based on the following ve principles.
P1 Infants' try to maximize the looking time at a stimulus.2
This principle explains why infants react to upcoming stimuli at all after seeing an
empty screen. However, since it takes around 200 ms to execute a saccade towards
a stimulus, the time spent looking directly at the stimulus can be further increased
by starting to move the eyes to its location even before it appears. Therefore, in-
fants will try to make predictions based on regularities in the sequence. Hence,
the decrease of reaction time and increase of anticipatory eye movements will go
hand in hand and can be explained by an increased ability to predict the sequence.
This addresses the question about why infants make anticipatory eye movements
at all.
This leads us directly to the next question: how do infants learn the structure of
a sequence and make predictions?
P2 Each input causes a dierent pattern of neural activations in the infant brain.
2For justications of this view the reader is referred to the general discussion is Sect. 5.9.5.3 A theory of visual expectations 83
P3 The learning of sequence representations is mediated by a plasticity mecha-
nism causally linking those patterns.
Imagine a population of neurons in the brain of an infant. At each point in time
some neurons will be active (i.e. emit a spike) and others will be non-active. This
activity pattern will change from one point in time to the next. Now, suppose
the infant is exposed to the pivot sequence: L-T-L-B-L-T-L-B... The principle P2
suggests that each input will cause a dierent pattern Si in the brain as shown in
Fig. 5.2A since visual exposure to a stimulus activates photoreceptors in the retina
which in turn in
uence the activity in the whole brain.
Now that a sequence of activity patterns is created, the plasticity mechanism pos-
tulated by P3 links the patterns causally, i.e. makes pattern Si cause Si+1 even in
the absence of input (see, Fig. 5.2B). Therefore, it is possible to say that the brain
has learned the sequence and is able to predict future inputs.
Although P2 and P3 establish a framework how the brain can learn a sequence it
is not clear how it could capture the structure of a sequence. Mapping each input
to a dierent pattern does not enable the brain to capture statistical regularities
in the sequence - an ability that infants certainly possess. Further postulates are
necessary.
At this point we make the following denition:
Let I1I2I3... be a sequence of inputs. A minimal required memory (MRM)
of an input I is the length of the shortest sequence preceding I and determining it
uniquely.
For illustration consider the sequence LTLBLTLB... What is the MRM of B? Im-
mediately before B there is an L which does not determine B uniquely since an L
could also be followed by a T. Therefore, a longer history needs to be considered.
Does the sequence part TL determine B? This time the answer is yes, since every
time there is a T followed by an L we can be sure that a B will follow (TL ! B).
Thus, the MRM of B is 2. Similarly, the MRM of T is 2 as well (BL ! T). As for
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Figure 5.2: A: The displayed input sequence causes various patterns in the infant
brain denoted by solid arrows. B: A plasticity mechanism makes the patterns cause
each other such that the brain is able to \predict" the next pattern / stimulus. C:
Before learning the patterns are random. After learning patterns are reorganized
according to principle P4.
of L is 1.
This denition is now applied in the next principle:
P4 Infants' ability to predict a future input decreases as the input's MRM grows5.3 A theory of visual expectations 85
larger.
Intuitively, the MRM is linked to the amount of working memory needed in order
to predict the next input. In other words, it is important how many inputs of a
sequence have to be kept in mind in order to be able to predict the next input.
If this number is large, the prediction task is harder and the performance will suer.
Applying P4 to the results summarized above turns out to be very fruitful. As
just discussed, for the pivot sequence it is easier to predict the L than the T or B.
Therefore, more correct anticipations can be expected for L as conrmed by result
4). Long sequences like LLLR certainly require more memory than shorter ones.
Thus, predicting them is more dicult which accounts for result 2). Similarly, in
the LLLR sequence the prediction of each L and nally R grows harder since its
MRM grows larger: R ! 1st L, RL ! 2nd L, RLL ! 3rd L, LLL ! R. There-
fore, the anticipation of R becomes more probable as the sequence proceeds which
accounts for result 3). Taken together, the principles P2, P3 and P4 account for
how sequences are learned.
Since P2 and P3 are expressed in terms of brain activity, it is fruitful to do the
same for P4 as well. The formed activity patterns in the brain, as postulated by
P2 have to be read out and transformed into an eye movement in order to produce
observable behavior including predictive eye movements. If a large MRM makes
the prediction task more dicult, two patterns whose MRM is large will be similar
since distinguishing similar patterns is more dicult (see Fig. 5.2C, e.g. \T" and
\B"). A conclusion from P2 and P4 is therefore that patterns with large MRM and
similar history will be harder to distinguish and therefore more dicult to predict.
This eect also explains why the patterns S1, S5, S9 etc. are mapped very closely
to each other: a long history has to be kept in mind in order to distinguish the
kth from the k + 1st occurrence of the sequence block LTLB. In fact, as we shall
see below, the patterns become so similar that is it reasonable to assign the same
name S1 to them as we did in Fig. 5.2B.
In order to clarify what happens during development and during a study we suggest
the 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P5 During development as well as during a study, the activity patterns corre-
sponding to the sequence inputs become more distinct.
P5 accounts for result 1) since as patterns grow more distinct the read-out can be
performed more easily leading to a higher percentage of correct anticipations and
smaller reaction time.
Taken together the ve principles account for the various experimental results and
also suggest the underlying causes for these results which are dicult to address
experimentally. In the following we suggest a computational model that embodies
these principles and proves that a mechanistic implementation is possible. Fur-
thermore, the behavior of the model matches qualitatively experimental results
described above.
5.4 Computational model
In order to implement a computational model of the outlined theory of visual
expectations it is necessary to use a mathematical structure that is capable of rep-
resenting and predicting an input time series. Recurrent neural networks (RNNs)
are natural candidates for this task and will thus be quickly reviewed in the next
secion (see Lukosevicius and Jaeger (2009) for a more elaborate review).
5.4.1 Recurrent neural networks (RNNs)
The characteristic feature that distinguishes RNNs from feedforward neural net-
works is that the connection topology processes cycles as opposed to simply com-
puting a function. Therefore, RNNs are able to develop a self-sustained temporal
activation dynamics even in the absence of input and to form a dynamical memory
that is able to process temporal information.
Formally, the problem to be solved by RNNs can be dened as a problem of
learning a functional relation between a given input ~ U(t) 2 RNU and a desired
output ~ Ztarget(t) 2 RNZ, where t = 1;:::;T, and is the number of data points5.4 Computational model 87
in the training dataset f(~ U(t); ~ Ztarget(t))g. In supervised learning paradigms the
relation is learned through minimization of some error measure E(~ Z; ~ Ztarget).
On the other hand, in unsupervised learning paradigms the target output is not
available, therefore the network parameters are updated to optimize some measure
dened on the network state and input only.
RNNs have been shown to be universal approximators of dynamical systems under
fairly mild assumptions (Funahashi and Nakamura, 1993) and therefore appear as
highly promising tools for time series processing. Despite these advantages and
their natural correspondence to neural networks in real nervous systems the im-
pact of RNNs in nonlinear modeling has remained limited for a long time. This
is mainly due to substantial diculties in training such networks. For example,
gradient-descent methods for minimizing the error measure can drive the network
dynamics through bifurcations (Doya, 1992) and therefore convergence can not
be guaranteed. Further, updates can be computationally expensive since many
update cycles may be necessary leading to long training times.
In this dicult situation, in 2001 a fundamentally new approach to RNN de-
sign was proposed under the name of Liquid State Machines (Maass et al., 2002)
and Echo State Networks (Jaeger, 2001) collectively referred to as reservoir com-
puting. In this paradigm the RNN is randomly created and remains unchanged
during training. The RNN is called reservoir and is passively excited by the input
signal and maintains in its state a nonlinear transformation of the input history.
The desired output signal is generated as a linear combination of the neuron sig-
nals from the input-excited reservoir. This linear combination is obtained through
linear regression, using the teacher signal as a target. The general idea behind
such designs is using the reservoir to expand the input history ~ U(t); ~ U(t   1);:::
into a rich enough reservoir state space ~ X(t) 2 RNE, while the output neurons
combine the neuron signals ~ X(t) into the desired output signal ~ Ztarget(t). There-
fore, the \purpose" of the reservoir is to contain a rich enough, high-dimensional
representation to make that possible.
The resulting systems could outperform previous methods in a wide range of tasks
and reservoir computing are therefore established methods nowadays (Lukosevi-88 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
cius and Jaeger, 2009). Despite these successes it is unlikely that a randomly
designed and static reservoir is optimal for more complex tasks. Therefore, re-
search in reservoir computing proceeds to explore various training mechanisms for
the reservoir. In this section we will make use the self-organizing recurrent neural
network developed by Lazar et al. (2009) that used spike timing dependent plas-
ticity and intrinsic plasticity to shape the reservoir structure.
5.4.2 Model architecture
The computational model3 is based on a self-organizing recurrent neural network
Lazar et al. (2009) and extends it by a reinforcement learning architecture. Its
construction is based on the principles suggested above.
Recurrent reservoir
The network reservoir consists of NE excitatory (E) and NI = 0:2NE inhibitory
(I) threshold units (Fig. 5.3)4. Neurons are connected through weighted synaptic
connections, where Wij is the connection strength from unit j to unit i. All possi-
ble E ! I and I ! E connections are present, while the E ! E connections are
random and sparse. Self-connections are prohibited.
At each time step, a subset of NU input units and another subset of NU gaze
units receives positive drive U = 1 when their state is active. The input units
and gaze units encode the position of the current visual stimuli and the current
gaze position, respectively. For example, the network can be presented a left-right
alternating input sequence by alternatingly activating the input units as shown
in Fig. 5.3 which could roughly be related to dierent regions of the retina of an
3MATLAB code is available upon request.
4An active excitatory/inhibitory neuron enhances/inhibits the depolarization (activation) of
all neurons it projects to.5.4 Computational model 89
Figure 5.3: The network architecture. Input sequences drive the recurrent reser-
voir. The reinforcement learning architecture performs eye movements that change
the gaze position in the next time step. This gaze position is provided as addi-
tional input to the network. Goal: make eye movements such that the gaze position
matches the input.
infant watching an alternating stimulus sequence. The gaze units carry oculomo-
tor feedback representing the current looking direction of the eyes of the infant.
Activity in the input and gaze units spreads through the recurrent network and
leads to a series of activity patterns. This ring activity of the network at the
discrete time t is given by:
Xi(t + 1) = 
0
@
NE X
j=1
W
EE
ij (t) Xj(t)  
NI X
j=1
W
EI
ij (t) Yj(t) + Ui(t)   T
E
i (t)
1
A (5.1)
and
Yi(t + 1) = 
0
@
NE X
j=1
W
IE
ij (t) Xj(t)   T
I
i
1
A; (5.2)90 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
where ~ X 2 RNE and ~ Y 2 RNI are activations of excitatory and inhibitory units, re-
spectively, W EE
ij , W EI
ij , W IE
ij are synaptic weights, ~ T E and ~ T I are threshold values,
 is the Heaviside step function, and ~ U is the additional input drive received only
by a predened selection of input and gaze neurons (see dashed ellipses in Fig. 5.3).
Basically, the network is driven by the input and gaze units and maps this activ-
ity into a high-dimensional reservoir space. Such a network fullls principle P2:
input sequences will drive the whole network population showing activity patterns.
Principle P3 demands that a plasticity mechanism imprint the causal structure
of the sequence into the network. Therefore, following Lazar et al. (2009) the net-
work is equipped with a biologically inspired learning rule: spike timing dependent
plasticity (Bi and Poo, 1998, Markram et al., 1997). In their simplied version a
connection strength between a pre- and a postsynaptic neuron is increased if the
postsynaptic neuron red a spike one time step after the presynaptic neuron and
it is decreased if the timing is reversed:
Wij(t) = STDP (Xi(t) Xj(t   1)   Xi(t   1) Xj(t)): (5.3)
In this way, two patterns that happen to succeed each other are causally linked
together such that the rst pattern makes the second pattern occur at the next
time step.
The network is also equipped with other biologically inspired mechanisms such
as intrinsic plasticity: the ring threshold of a neuron adjusts such that it keeps
its average output ring rate constant at the value H0:
T
E
i (t + 1) = T
E
i (t) + IP (Xi(t)   H0): (5.4)
Synaptic scaling is introduced for homeostatic purposes and enforces that all in-
coming connection strengths are normalized to sum up to 1:
Wij(t) =
Wij P
j Wij(t)
: (5.5)
As will be discussed later (Sect. 5.8.5 and 5.8.1), principles P4 and P5 emerge
automatically from the architecture of the model.5.4 Computational model 91
Summary of reservoir behavior
Lazar et al. (2009) analyzed the behavior of the reservoir that will be summarized
in the following. In contrast to our model, the reservoir was extended with readout
neurons that were trained in a supervised fashion to predict the next input, i.e. a
readout neuron was required to be activated if and only if the corresponding input
neuron subset will be activated in the next time step.
 The network outperformed static reservoirs in a \counting" task. The net-
work showed considerable increase in memory capacity and was able to pre-
dict a change in the input even after 20 time steps of constant input.
 Hierarchical clustering of the reservoir states showed the spreading of input
conditions over many clusters of the reservoir states. For example, in the
\counting" task, when presented an input sequence `abbbb...bc' it is impor-
tant to map the 5th and the 6th `b' onto dierent reservoir states in order
to be able to discriminate them. The network achieves that more eectively
than a static reservoir that tends to lump several input conditions into the
same clusters.
 A principal component analysis of the reservoir states revealed that the net-
work learns to map each input condition into a tight cluster of reservoir states
while the states move further apart from each other as learning proceeds thus
enabling an eective representation of input conditions.
 As learning proceeds the network dynamics moves to a stable regime as
revealed by perturbation analysis.
 All reservoir neurons become active at some point as opposed to random
reservoirs that often contain a high percentage of inactive neurons.
 Reservoir neurons tend to become more input specic and tuned.
 Homeostatic mechanisms turn out to be crucial for healthy network dynam-
ics. Without synaptic normalization the network develops seizure-like burst-
ing activity where the neurons' activities are highly correlated. Without
intrinsic plasticity neurons tend to become either hyperactive or not active
at all.92 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
For a more detailed computational modeling and theoretical analysis the reader
is referred to Lazar et al. (2009). Subsequently, we will discuss our reinforcement
learning extension of the reservoir.
Reinforcement learning architecture (RLA)
We extend the original network by Lazar et al. (2009) by replacing the readout
neurons by action neurons and by implementing a version of on-line temporal
dierence learning. Basically, the reinforcement learning architecture takes the
high-dimensional reservoir states re
ecting the current input and gaze position
and maps them to one of two possible actions (e.g. move gaze to left or right).
Accordingly, the gaze position at the next time step corresponds to the action (eye
movement) performed. As principle P1 demands, the looking time at a stimulus,
i.e. the number of occurrences where the gaze equals the input position, is maxi-
mized by the reinforcement learning mechanisms.
More specically, let n be the number of input types, e.g. n = 2 if an input
can occur left or right. Accordingly, there are also n gaze positions and n possible
actions (the action \no action" is modeled implicitly if no action unit is activated).
Each reservoir unit is connected to the action units by the connectivity matrix
V . An action a is picked from a softmax probability distribution
p(a) =
exp(Qa=T)
P
b exp(Qb=T)
; (5.6)
where the action value is given by ~ Q( ~ X) = V  ~ X and T is the softmax temperature.
The action a determines the gaze position g at the next time step
g(t)  a(t   1):
At each time step the network receives a reward dened by
r =
(
+1 if i = g
 1 if i 6= g5.4 Computational model 93
where i denotes the current input, e.g. i = 1;2 for inputs \left" or \right". This
reward and the action values of the current and next time steps are used to calculate
the temporal dierence error
 = r + 
 maxa0Qa0( ~ X
0)   Qa;
where ~ X0 denotes the next state of the reservoir and 
 is the discount factor. The
temporal dierence error  can then be used to globally modulate the weights Vak
from reservoir unit k to action unit a of the actor:
Vak =   Xk;
with  being the learning rate. This algorithm is a simple form of on-line gradient-
descent TD(0) learning with an action-value function linear in the states. The
reader is referred to the standard literature for details (see, e.g. Sutton and Barto
(1998), chapter 8).
Model parameters
The following table summarizes the model parameters.
Parameter name Variable Value
Number of neurons NE 60/80
Number of neurons per input NU 8
Connection probability between 0.2
two excitatory neurons
Average ring rate H0 0.27/0.20
STDP learning rate STDP 0.001
IP learning rate IP 0.001
Discount factor 
 0.7
Reinforcement learning rate  0.05
Softmax temperature T 1.0
Note: 60/80 means that in all experiments the network consisted of 60 units except94 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
Experiment 2 with 80 units since three dierent input and gaze populations were
necessary and too few neurons would be left for the reservoir otherwise.
5.5 Experiment 1: Modelling the LR, LLR, LLLR
and IR sequences
5.5.1 Modelling procedure
In Experiment 1 we train the network with one of four kinds of sequences: a left-
right alternating sequence (LR), sequences where the left input is shown two or
three times before the right input (LLR and LLLR) or a sequence made up from all
of the mentioned sequences that are picked randomly with equal probability (e.g.
LLRLRLRLLLRLRLLR...) which we call irregular sequence (IR) in accordance
with Caneld and Haith (1991).5
During training the input neurons of the network receive additional drive accord-
ing to the sequence that the network is trained to learn. The performance of the
network is tested regularly for 100 time steps as learning proceeds. During this
time the softmax temperature is reduced exponentially from T = 1:0 to T = 0:1
(simulated annealing) in order to reduce stochastic exploration of actions with
time which is necessary for the system to reach optimal performance. During the
last 50 time steps the gaze behavior of the network is recorded.
5.5.2 Results
Fig. 5.4 exemplies the model's behavior after successful learning of the LLLR se-
quence. In this example, the time ranges from 1 to 30, as shown at the bottom of
the gure. Subgure (A) shows the input sequence given to the network: L-L-L-R-
L-L-L-R-... Subgure (B) shows the activity of the network reservoir consisting of
5Use of language: throughout the section the term \experiment" is meant to refer to modelling
experiments as opposed to the term \study" which denotes infant experiments.5.5 Experiment 1: Modelling the LR, LLR, LLLR and IR sequences 95
Figure 5.4: Network activity after successful learning. A: Input sequence LLLR.
B: Reservoir activity. The rst 16 units receive additional input drive according
to the input sequence in A), the second 16 units receive additional gaze drive.
C: Actions performed by the network. One time step after each action the gaze
shifts to the corresponding position, as can be observed in B). D: Reward for the
network. White: reward = +1; black: reward =  1. E: Output drive denoting the
mean activity vectors (F) times the action unit matrix V . Re
ects the net input
for the output units. F: Mean activity vectors from B) for each input situation
L1, L2, L3 and R.
60 neurons as shown on the left side of the subplot. White and black dots denote
active and non-active neurons, respectively. The rst 16 neurons are input neurons
that represent the LLLR input sequence, while the rst 1-8 neurons tend to get96 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
active when the input is L and the neurons 9-16 are activated when the input is
R. Note, that not all of the neurons 1-8 get active because the intrinsic plastic-
ity rule adjusts the activation theshold such that a predened mean ring rate
is sustained. In addition to the input sequence neurons, there are gaze neurons
17-32 that are activated according to the action performed a the previous time
step (C). For example, at the third time step, the action R is performed (subplot
C). Therefore, the gaze units 25-32 get activated at the fourth time step (subplot
B). Analogously, when at the fourth time step, the action L is performed, (most)
gaze units 17-24 are activated at the fth time step. In this way actions in
uence
the network activity. As a whole group, the units 1-32 drive the network. This
activation spreads through the recurrent network and leads to a series of activity
patterns that seem to converge to a cycle of four patterns (reservoir states) after
learning (F). We see, that the network pattern repeats every fourth time step,
which corresponds to the sequence length LLLR that repeats over and over. Av-
eraging the activity of the time steps 1, 5, 9, 13, ..., 28 leads to the rst pattern L1
in subplot (F). Similarly, averaging over the time steps 2, 6, 10, ..., 29 denes the
second pattern L2, and so on. After learning the activity seems to have converged
to these four cluster centers and cycles through them indenitely (see Sect. 5.8 for
further investigation of this issue).
The actions are selected through matrix V which maps the reservoir activity to the
action units (e.g. move gaze to left or right), Fig. 5.3. Subsequently, this output
drive (E) is used to select the actions (C) by the softmax rule (5.6) (Fig. 5.4).
Since the matrix V is initialized randomly, the model picks random actions in
the beginning and therefore performs also random gaze shifts. This is not the
case any more after learning in Fig 5.4. Subplot (B) shows that the gaze unit
activities (17-32) correlate strongly with the input unit activities (1-16). This is
exactly what the reinforcement learning architecture accomplishes: it adjusts the
action connection matrix such that the correct gaze shifts are performed in order
to match the input unit activity. Such behavior is rewarded as depicted in subplot
(D) where the obtained reward is almost always +1 (white).5.5 Experiment 1: Modelling the LR, LLR, LLLR and IR sequences 97
In the following we dene several measures based on the network's gaze behavior.
The results of this behavior in the course of learning are shown in Fig. 5.5.
Performance
The performance is measured as the average reward received by the network dur-
ing the test phase. Since the reward can be  1 or +1 the performance also ranges
between  1 and +1.
Reaction time
Since we do not use inter-stimulus intervals and each stimulus lasts for one time
step the network can show only two types of behavior towards a stimulus: anticipa-
tory and reactive. They refer to the network initiating an eye movement one time
step before or concurrently with the occurrence of the right stimulus, respectively.
Accordingly, anticipatory eye movements are assigned a reaction time of  1 and
reactive eye movements +1.6
Percent anticipation
This variable measures the proportion of anticipatory eye movements in relation
to all eye movements to the right stimulus (R).
6These values are chosen such that a random eye movement policy leads to zero average
reaction time.98 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
Gaze shifts to the right/correct stimulus
These measures denote the proportions of gaze shifts to the right/correct stimulus.
For example, in the LLLR sequence it is measured how often the gaze is shifted to
the right/correct stimulus after the occurrence of the rst left, second left, third
left or right stimulus. \Correct" refers to the cases when the anticipatory gaze
shifts are followed by the actual occurrence of a stimulus at the anticipated posi-
tion.
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Figure 5.5: Results of Experiment 1: LR, LLR, LLLR and IR sequences as a
function of training time. Dashed lines denote the chance level. Shaded areas
denote the standard errors after 100 simulations. A: Average reward. B: Reaction
time and percent anticipations of the right stimulus. C: Probability of a gaze shift
to the right while the actual input is the rst left (L1, blue), second left (L2, green),
third left (L3, black) or right (R, red) stimulus. D: Probability of a correctly
anticipated gaze shift to the rst left (L1), second left (L2), third left (L3) or right
(R) stimulus.5.5 Experiment 1: Modelling the LR, LLR, LLLR and IR sequences 99
The results in Fig. 5.5 can be summarized in the following way.
1. For all regular sequences, with increasing training time,
a) the reaction time decreases and saturates at some point (Fig. 5.5B),
b) the probability of correct anticipations increases while the probability of
wrong anticipations decreases (see Fig. 5.5B (percent anticipations), C
and D).
2. As sequences get more complex
a) the reaction time increases (Fig. 5.5B),
b) the dierences between reaction times toward sequences of dierent com-
plexity rst increase with training time and then decrease again as train-
ing time grows large (Fig. 5.5B),
c) the probability of correct anticipatory gaze shifts to the right decreases
(see Fig. 5.5C, red curves, and D).
3. The probability of an anticipatory gaze shift to the right increases with each
presentation of a left stimulus (see Fig. 5.5C).
4. This result will be mentioned below in Experiment 2.
5. The probability of correct anticipations decrease from L1, L2, L3 to R
(Fig. 5.5D).
5.5.3 Discussion
The rst three results conform to experimental observations summarized in
Sect. 5.2. Result 1) can be interpreted in two ways: the training time can be
seen as modelling both the age of the infant and the number of trials presented
to the infant during a session. Both interpretations are supported by experimen-
tal data. On the one hand, the most natural interpretation of training time is
the trial number since infants get repeatedly exposed to the sequences during the100 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
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Figure 5.6: Learning pace as a function of the reinforcement learning rate . The
y-axis shows the average point in time when the model reaches performance 0.5.
Data was acquired for the LR sequence and averaged after 100 stimulations.
study. On the other hand, the age of the infant can be modeled as learning rate
of the algorithms. Indeed, infants' reaction time decreases with age even for un-
predictable sequences which has been suggested to due to increasing processing
speed (Caneld et al., 1997). Fig. 5.6 shows that, as expected, the LR sequence
as acquired faster as the learning rate increases up to values of  = 0:07 (after
that learning can not converge because the learning rate is too high). Therefore,
for small learning rates, the results in Fig. 5.5 would be stretched, i.e. the network
needs more time to reach the same performance levels. In this way, varying learn-
ing rates account for age dierences. Therefore, as we are pursuing a qualitative
account, training time will be considered as modeling both trial number and infant
age in the following.
Analogously to infants, the model develops spatiotemporal expectations by cop-
ing with delayed reward and initiating anticipatory gaze shifts before the onset
of stimuli (compare Fig. 5.4B and C). This leads to an increase of the percent-5.6 Experiment 2: Modelling the pivot sequence: left-top-left-bottom 101
age of anticipations (1b) and a necessary corresponding decrease in reaction time
(1a) since any anticipation counts as reaction time of  1. We see this observation
conrmed by Fig. 5.5B where the increase in anticipations mirrors the decrease in
reaction time. Note that the irregular sequence is not without structure since it is
made up of randomly picked LR, LLR and LLLR sequences which carries a lot of
probabilistic information.
As for result 2a), the proposed model behaves similarly to infants since learn-
ing the structure of a longer sequence requires more memory (the various L's need
to be distinguished from each other) and therefore more learning time. Note, that
thereby the model automatically captures principle P4 without the need to build
it in purposefully (see Sect. 5.8.5 for details). The age dierences (2b) are also
explained by the model in the following way. For all sequences the gaze behavior
is random at the beginning of the training. Therefore, there has to be a grad-
ual increase in the dierences between the various sequence types in the course
of training. As training time grows large though, the dierencies diminish again
since the reaction times saturate at the same level for all deterministic sequences.
This constitutes a prediction of the model. Result 2c) mirrors result 2a) and is
therefore not surprising given that the reaction time increases with the complexity
of the sequences.
Since principle P4 is implemented by the model we have already explained how it
accounts for result 3) in Sect. 5.3. Result 5) is a direct consequence of this principle
and constitutes a prediction of the model. In Sect. 5.8.5 it will be explained how
the computational model realizes this principle.
5.6 Experiment 2: Modelling the pivot sequence:
left-top-left-bottom
In order to gain a more general view on the development of visual expectations
it is instructive to look at sequences other than just left and right alternating ones.102 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
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Figure 5.7: Results of Experiment 2. Dashed lines denote the chance level.
5.6.1 Modelling procedure
Following an experimental study by Reznick et al. (2000) the stimuli can occur at
three possible positions: left (L), top (T) and bottom (B). The stimuli are dis-
played in a deterministic manner: L-T-L-B-L-T-L-B.... Accordingly, the model is
endowed with three position inputs, three gaze inputs and three gaze shift outputs
with eight reservoir units reserved for each position resulting in 48 input units in
total. The network size was increased to 80 units. Otherwise all parameters were
kept at the same value as in Experiment 1.
5.6.2 Results
All experimentally observed results are conrmed by our model:
1. Reaction time decreases with training time while the percentage of anticipa-
tions increases (Fig. 5.7B).
4. The probability of correct anticipations is higher for the pivot stimulus (left)
than for either of the wing stimuli (top and bottom) (Fig. 5.7C).5.7 Experiment 3: Learning and relearning 103
5.6.3 Discussion
As discussed in the previous section result 1) is a consequence of successful learn-
ing rewarded when the gaze is a priori shifted to the correct stimulus position.
Result 4) conrms directly the corresponding experimental result. We observe
that for the pivot sequence as well as the previous sequences the model behaves
according to principle P4: since the pivot stimulus occurs twice as often as either
of the wing stimuli and learning the occurrence of the pivot stimulus is easier be-
cause it requires less memory.
5.7 Experiment 3: Learning and relearning
Facilitated reacquisition of already learned tasks has been observed in rabbit con-
ditioning (Frey and Ross, 1968) and infant memory retention tasks (Rovee-Collier,
1999). Infant memory is usually studied with the mobile task where infants learn
to move a crib mobile by kicking a ribbon strung between a mobile hook and one
ankle. Retention of memory is measured via an increase in the average kick rate.7
As for visual expectations the question whether infants learn the structure of a
sequence faster if they already learned it in the past as compared to learning it for
the rst time has not been investigated yet. The following experiment uses our
model to predict the result of such a future study which can serve as a test for the
model.
5.7.1 Modelling procedure
The network is exposed to the LR sequence for 1000 time steps which is enough
for the performance to saturate. Subsequently, the input sequence is switched to
7This task can also be viewed as an instrumental conditioning task although there is debate
about the role of implicit vs. explicit memory in the denition of the task (Rovee-Collier, 1997).104 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
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Figure 5.8: Learning and relearning of the LR sequence. A: Average performance
curves from 100 simulations tted with a least squares t of the function fa;b;(t) =
a exp( t=)+b. B: Widths  of the exponential ts of learning the LR sequence
for the rst time versus relearning it again after T time steps. Gray shaded areas
denote the standard errors.
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5.7.2 Results
Fig. 5.8A shows the mean performance curve of the model based on 100 simu-
lations. Each time when the input sequence is changed there is a drop in the
performance. Even by visual inspection it can be observed that the increase in
performance is faster for relearning than for learning. This result is conrmed
quantitatively by measuring the widths of tted exponential curves to the per-
formance data (Fig. 5.8B), where the relearning time stays signicantly below the
learning times for a wide range of lags. Even after 11-12 times the average learning
time (145) has passed, relearning is still faster (1700  12  145).
5.7.3 Discussion
It is not easy to explain this behavior of the model. We conjecture that it is due
to the characteristics of the reinforcement learning architecture: it takes time to
build and rebuild the mapping from the reservoir to the action units, i.e. the ac-
tion connection matrix V needs time in the order of 1500 time steps to change
(Fig. 5.8B)). Also, it is dicult to destroy a working network conguration (LR
sequence) since it requires to solve a hen-egg problem: the new reservoir states
necessary for learning the action connection matrix are dicult to learn since a
frequent wrong gaze unit input mediated by a yet wrong action connection matrix
disturbs the formation of the new reservoir states. Consequently, a once learned
representation is upheld for a long time as observed in Fig. 5.8B.
5.8 Analysis of model behavior
In the previous sections we successfully modeled the LR, LLR, LLLR, IR and the
pivot sequences. In the following the model's behavior will be studied in more
detail in the case of the LLLR sequence. The analysis consists the following steps.
In Sect. 5.8.1 it will be shown that the reservoir activity develops accoring to the106 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
main results of Lazar et al. (2009) described in Sect. 5.4.2. Specically, it will be
shown that the reservoir states cycle between four cluster centers after learning.
In the subsequent section the construction of the reinforcement learning architec-
ture (RLA) will be discussed and justied. In Sect. 5.8.3 the coupling between
the reservoir and the RLA will be analyzed through the study of random gaze
positions. The subsequent section will show that the reservoir state clusters that
develop after learning are actually suitable for reinforcement learning. Finally, in
Sect. 5.8.5 we will investigate how the model realizes the important principle P4
and relate it to various obtained results.
5.8.1 Development of the reservoir activity
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Figure 5.9: Principal components of the network activity in the LLLR sequence.
The rst two principal components account for 60% - 70% of the variance.
Fig. 5.4B) and F) suggested that the reservoir activity cycles through four clusters
of states (F) in the reservoir state space. The development of this behavior is
shown in Fig. 5.9 that visualizes the projection of the reservoir activity onto its
rst two principal components8. Each point in the gure corresponds to a state
in the reservoir state space. At the beginning of the training (training time = 0)
the reservoir responds rst unstably to the input sequence LLLR. The reservoir
activity moves irregularly through the state space. Unsupervised learning with
8Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is a mathematical technique for mapping high-
dimensional data such as the 60 dimensional reservoir state to a low-dimensional space that
captures the highest variance of the data. For example, this enables plotting high-dimensional
data on the two-dimensional plane, as shown in Fig. 5.9.5.8 Analysis of model behavior 107
STDP makes the reservoir states that correspond to the same input role (L1, L2,
L3, R) converge to distinct cluster centers, as was discussed in context of Fig. 5.4F.
This is also re
ected by Fig. 5.9, training time = 4500, where the reservoir activity
visits basically only four distinct states. These cluster centers move further apart
as learning proceeds which means that the clusters in Fig. 5.4F become more and
more distinct with time. This corresponds to the requirement of principle P5: the
reservoir patterns that correspond to the various stimuli move apart from each
other as learning proceeds. Once the pattern sequence is learned the network is
autonomously able to sustain its activity sequence even in the absence of inputs
thereby predicting future input states. Note that although during L1, L2 and L3
the input to the network is the same, the network manages to treat them dier-
ently, thereby implicitly \enumerating" them. This behavior is not trivial since
the network treats the various presentations of a left input dierently (L1, L2 and
L3) while treating the corresponding inputs at the subsequent trials similarly (e.g.
at each trial L1 corresponds to the same cluster center). This is due to the fact
that during the presentations of L the reservoir's recurrent activity assigns dier-
ent states to the L's while the presentation of R strongly perturbs this activity
basically resetting the reservoir state back to L1 (see also discussion after the in-
troduction of principle P4 in Sect. 5.3).
5.8.2 Construction of the reinforcement learning architec-
ture (RLA)
The extension of the reservoir by the RLA is not trivial because of the RLA's
feedback in
uence on the reservoir. As was observed in our simulations, even in
absence of the RLA the reservoir develops four distinct state clusters in the case
of the LLLR sequence which is in accordance with previous results (Lazar et al.,
2009). In a simplied construction without gaze units it has been tried to map the
four points in the reservoir space to action units using a reinforcement learning
procedure that learns the weights of the connection matrix V . Although this feed-
forward extension would not have complicated the model because of the absence
of feedback to the reservoir, a closer look reveals that proper learning would not108 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
be possible for the following reason. The model is based on our hypothesis that
infants receive a reward whenever their gaze position equals the input position.
Therefore, in order to dene the reward the gaze position has to be represented in
the reinforcement learning state space.
As a second trial, one could consider to represent the gaze position by a variable
separate from the reservoir activity. Roughly speaking, the reinforcement learning
state space will now consist of eight states, two gaze states times four reservoir
states. In that case the gaze position could be used in order to dene the reward
but it would not be re
ected by the reservoir activity in any way. This bears
the problem though that learning will not converge since it requires eight distinct,
mostly non-overlapping states. In our case though the reservoir activity is the
same for both gaze positions. Since the gaze position determines the reward, the
same connection weights of the matrix V to this reservoir activity will sometimes
be strengthened and sometimes weakened depending on the reward. Therefore,
proper learning and convergence is hindered by this construction. Fig. 5.11C)
shows how the performance of reinforcement learning in a simplied model (see
below) declines with increasing overlap of the states. Since the reservoir activity
is the same for either gaze position, the maximal overlap (dened below) is 1,
therefore learning must fail as witnessed by Fig. 5.11C).
For these reasons it is necessary to acquire eight distinct reservoir states for each
gaze  input combination. Thus, it seems necessary to include the gaze units into
the reservoir that are determined by the RLA's actions.
5.8.3 Coupling the RLA to the reservoir
In order to investigate the roles of the reservoir separately from the RLA and the
role of their coupling, the feedback from the RLA to the reservoir was decoupled
for the rst 5000 time steps during which the gaze position was picked randomly
with uniform probability. After 5000 time steps the RLA was coupled again to
the reservoir, i.e. the action unit activities determined the gaze positions at the5.8 Analysis of model behavior 109
subsequent time step.
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Figure 5.10: A: Principal components of the network activity in the LLLR se-
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rst two principal components account
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5000 steps of learning after coupling the RLA to the gaze units. B and C: Cluster
centers of reservoir activity before coupling and 5000 time steps after coupling.
Fig. 5.10A) shows the principal components of the reservoir activity from time
steps 4801 until 5000, where the states were colored according to the current input
 gaze combination. Indeed, the reservoir activity has fallen into eight clusters
even though the gaze positions were picked randomly. The gure also shows that
even after coupling the gaze units back to the RLA the eight cluster centers do
not change their position much as depicted by the dashed lines although the RLA
quickly reaches a high performance level after coupling (Fig. 5.11A). This is con-
rmed by direct observation of the cluster centers in Fig. 5.10 before (B) and after
(C) coupling and learning for another 5000 time steps. We conclude that the reser-
voir is able to develop eight distinct clusters both during the random gaze phase
and keep the same states during learning with the gaze positions coupled to the
RLA.110 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
This situation seems to simplify the task for the RLA considerably since the cou-
pling is not dynamically changing which would have required the RLA to adapt
constantly. In the contrary, the task for the RLA is thus reduced to learn the
appropriate mapping from the eight mostly static reservoir states to the actions.
In the following it will be shown that the RLA is able to succeed in this task.
5.8.4 Relation between learning performance and the state
overlap
The introduction of gaze units into the reservoir was motivated by the requirement
of eight distinct states for reinforcement learning to be possible. In this subsection
we investigate whether the reservoir states as depicted in Fig. 5.10B) and C) are
actually distinct enough.
Let f ~ X1; ~ X2;:::; ~ Xng be a set of NE-dimensional vectors. Then we dene the
overlap between two vectors i and j as the cosine of the angle between those
vectors:

ij 
~ XT
i  ~ Xj
jj ~ Xijj  jj ~ Xjjj
: (5.7)
The overlap 
 of the whole set of vectors will be dened as

  max
i;j

ij: (5.8)
Fig. 5.11B) shows the development of the overlap of the eight cluster centers (com-
pare Fig. 5.10B and C) as a function of training time. Especially before the cou-
pling of the gaze units to the RLA at 5000 time steps the maximal overlap ranges
at around 0.9 begging the question of whether the reservoir states are distinct
enough for learning.
In order to investigate that question we implemented a separate model using the
same reinforcement learning architecture but without the reservoir. The eight5.8 Analysis of model behavior 111
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Figure 5.11: Relation between reinforcement learning and reservoir state overlaps.
A: Reinforcement learning performance as a function of training time. The gaze
states are coupled to the RLA after 5000 time steps. B: Maximal overlap 
 as
dened in eq. (5.8). C: Relation between learning performance and the overlap 

obtained by a separate simulation.
NE = 60-dimensional states were created articially according to the following
procedure. The rst ! 2 f0;1;:::;NEg components of each vector was set to 1.
For each remaining component one and only one vector component was set to 1
resulting the following exemplary scheme:
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We run 100 simulations for each value of ! and calculated the average overlap of
the vectors. The reinforcement learning performance was measured as the average
reward during the last 50 time steps of the total 300 time steps of the simulation.
Plotting the overlap against the performance resulted in Fig. 5.11C).
We observe that even for overlaps as high as 0.9 the reinforcement learning per-112 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
formance is above 0.8 (corresponding to 90% because of the scaling between -1
and +1) and declines quickly as the overlap approaches 1.0. In this simulation the
state vectors re
ected the \worst case" since they we required to have a pairwise
overlap of 
 instead of only some pair of vectors. We conclude that even in the
worst case scenario, an overlap of 0.9 is low enough to reinforcement learning to
succeed.
In summary, our analysis of the coupling between the reservoir and the RLA leads
to the following picture. The reservoir captures the structure of the sequence in-
puts by mapping them onto eight reservoir states | four for each of the LLLR
input and two for each of the gaze positions even though at the beginning the
gaze position may 
uctuate randomly due to the initialization of the RLA. The
eight reservoir states remain suciently stable during learning therefore enabling
the RLA to learn the appropriate mapping from the reservoir states to the action
units. A separate simulation showed that the RLA can cope with this problem
even up to state overlaps of 0.9. The analysis of our model showed that the actual
overlaps are low enough for the RLA to get started with learning. As Fig. 5.11B)
shows, the overlap decreases signicantly to values around 0.5 as learning proceeds
and thereby facilitating learning even more. The decrease of the overlap re
ects
that the model learns to visit only the four (less overlapping) rewarding states out
of the eight states in agreement with Fig. 5.9.
5.8.5 Development of correct anticipations
At this point, it is useful to discuss the development of correct anticipations and
their ordering in Experiments 1 and 2. In Figs. 5.5D and 5.7C the ordering of cor-
rect anticipations depends heavily on the sequence and the position of the stimulus
in agreement with experimental results (Caneld and Haith, 1991, Caneld and
Smith, 1996, Reznick et al., 2000). Specically, the probability of correct antici-
pations does not develop equally fast for dierent sequences and positions in the
sequence, e.g. the anticipation of L1 develops faster than L3 (Fig. 5.5D, LLLR).
In Sect. 5.3 it has been shown that principle P4 can account for these dierences5.8 Analysis of model behavior 113
demanding that the prediction ability of a stimulus be dependent on the required
memory necessary to unambiguously determine it.
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Figure 5.12: Euclidean distances of the activity cluster centers to their closest
neighbors. For each sequences the network was run 100 times for 2500 time steps
and the mean activity after learning was measured and grouped according to the
input stimuli. The MRM of each sequence element was determined according to
the denition of MRM in Sect. 5.3.
We quantied the behavior of our model in Fig. 5.12 where the separation of a
cluster center from all the others was measured by calculating the Euclidean dis-
tance of each cluster center to its closest neighbor. The gure shows that for all
sequences the distances decrease as the MRM of a stimulus increases in agreement
with principle P4. Note that the network was run for only 2500 time steps where
only intermediate performance is achieved (compare Figs. 5.5 and 5.7). This is due
to the observation that after learning has converged, the cluster centers move far-
ther apart from each other and the dierences in their distances fade away which
is in agreement with principle P5.
In order to investigate the relation between the distances of the cluster centers
and the MRM, we studied the behavior of the reservoir further. As quantied
above, stimuli that are uniquely determined by the previous stimulus are assigned
a state far away from the other states, since all other states are driven by varying
preceding input stimuli by assumption. Therefore, stimuli requiring less memory
can also be anticipated more easily, e.g. the pivot stimulus L in the LTLB sequence.114 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
On the other hand, if a stimulus requires more memory (e.g. T), i.e. the previous
stimulus (L) does not determine it completely, it will be mapped to a similar state
in the state space as all the other stimuli that can also be successors of L, e.g. B.
Therefore, T and B can not be distinguished from each other as easily as the state
L from T and B which leads T and B to be anticipated less successfully than L as
re
ected by Fig. 5.7C. Taken together, this behavior of the model realizes principle
P4.
5.9 General discussion
In this chapter we reviewed experimental data on visual expectations in infancy
and developed a theory of visual expectations based on ve principles. We imple-
mented a computational model according to those principles. The model success-
fully explains infants' reaction time and anticipation behavior during the left-right
(LR) alternating sequence, the asymmetric sequences LLR and LLLR and the
more complex pivot sequence (left-top-left-bottom). Through a synergistic com-
bination of plasticity mechanisms the network maps the sequence of inputs to
distinct reservoir states and thereby enumerates repeating states. A reinforcement
learning architecture learns to perform accurate eye movements that enable the
comparison to infant data. It can also cope with the delayed reward given for a
successful xation of the stimulus which is necessary for anticipatory eye move-
ments.
5.9.1 Related work
Our model is novel from several points of view. First, to our knowledge there
are no other computational models for the development of sequence learning in
infants in the literature although models of other forms of visual expectations like
predictive gaze control for object trajectories (Balkenius and Johansson, 2007) do
exist.5.9 General discussion 115
Second, as far as we know the model is the rst fully recurrent neural network
used in developmental psychology of infants. Elman networks (Elman, 1990) have
been used widely including our work on causality and occlusion perception (Chap-
ter 2) but they are only partly recurrent. Elman networks (Lin and Mitchell, 1992)
and variants (Saeb et al., 2009) using reinforcement learning have also been sug-
gested but not in the context of infant research.
Third, the model is also novel from the technical point of view. Articial neu-
ral networks have widely been used as function approximators in reinforcement
learning for maintaining the value function of an agent (Tesauro and Sejnowski,
1989, Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996). On the contrary, only limited work has al-
ready been done using recurrent neural networks, probably because of diculties
in training such networks. Perhaps the closest work to ours has been done on rein-
forcement learning with echo state networks (ESN) (Szita et al., 2006). Contrary
to ESNs or liquid state machines (Maass et al., 2002) that use a dynamic reservoir
with xed connection weights our model uses dierent interacting plasticity mech-
anisms and forms more eective representations than networks with xed weights
(Lazar et al., 2009).
Finally, our model diers from the model by Lazar et al. (2009) by using a re-
inforcement learning architecture to model the infants' actions (eye movements).
Note, that the architecture is not only built \on top" of the reservoir but also
in
uences the reservoir activity though the action dependent activity of the gaze
neurons leading to non-trivial dynamics.
5.9.2 General account for sequence learning in infancy
The account of the model for sequence learning in infancy can be summarized in
the following way. When infants are exposed to sequences of interesting visual
stimuli they try to maximize the looking time at each of the stimuli (principle P1).
We suggest that this principle guides the looking behavior only as long as infants
are interested in the stimuli and the task. As observed by Haith and McCarty
(1990), p. 73, infants' interest level tends \to reach a peak performance level, and116 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
then their performance declines". Of course, on average infants will habituate
to the sequence at some point. Furthermore, there are whole research areas on
intrinsic motivation, saliency maps, familiarity vs. novelty preferences in infants
etc. that certainly in
uence infants' gaze behavior. Principle P1 would have to be
extended in order to incorporate these ideas but we choose to keep it at that for
the sake of simplicity and for the purposes of our model.
As already discussed above, principle P1 leads to the necessity of predicting the
stimulus sequence. In the context of our model, infants succeed in the predic-
tion task in the following way. When exposed to two consecutive stimuli L and
R two neuronal populations S1 and S2 emit spikes in an infant's brain (principle
P2). Since S2 follows S1 in time the spike timing dependent plasticity (STDP)
rule strengthens the synapses from S1 to S2 (principle P3). In future, when the
infant is repeatedly exposed to stimulus L, the activity of neuronal population S1
spreads via the strengthened synapses and activates population S2 even without
being driven by stimulus R. In this sense, it is possible to speak of prediction: the
infant's brain has learned to predict stimulus R. Even if the same stimulus L is
displayed repeatedly the network maps it to distinct activity patterns L1, L2 and
L3 (see Fig. 5.4B and F) because the activity of the recurrent network is constantly
changing and evolving.
On top of this prediction reservoir a motor system reads the pattern sequences
in such a way that appropriate gaze shifts can be performed to maximize the
reward. Specically, correct anticipations increase with time paralleling the net-
work's ability to predict future stimuli. Similarly, the reaction time decreases due
to increased anticipations.
5.9.3 Predictions of the model
1. The correct anticipations for any sequences are ordered by the principle P4
(see also Sect. 5.8.5). For example, the complex LRLLR sequence should
be anticipated in the following way. Disambiguating it with L1R1L2L3R2
it follows that percentages of correct anticipations should be ordered as L3,
R1 < R2 < L1, L2 since MRM(L3), MRM(R1) > MRM(R2) > MRM(L1),
MRM(L2). In other words, it should be easiest for infants (and adults) to5.9 General discussion 117
anticipate L1 and L2 and hardest to anticipate L3 and R1 while anticipating
R2 should be of intermediate diculty.
2. Relearning happens faster than learning (Experiment 3).
3. Infants' looking behavior is independent of the particular stimulus position
given the same sequence, e.g. a left-right alternation should not lead to dif-
ferent behavior than a up-down alternation (as observed by Reznick et al.
(2000), Experiment 2).
4. As observed in experimental result 2a), the dierences in reaction time to
sequences of various complexity increases with age (e.g. from 2- to 3-month-
olds). Our model predicts that these dierences will decrease again as infants
grow older (see Fig. 5.5B and corresponding discussion of result 2a)). We
estimate that this should happen by the end of the rst year of life.
5.9.4 Limitations and future work
One of the problems limiting a detailed modeling of infant studies is the diculty
of extending the model to realistic time scales. The durations used in experimental
studies are usually of the order of 1000 ms. On the other hand the time scale of
STDP is around 20 ms which has to be taken as corresponding to one time step.
Therefore, a realistic model would use stimulus durations of roughly 50 time steps.
Our model would not work with such long sequences because the network's mem-
ory is not large enough. Enlarging the network to more units may help but other
than that scaling network performances to realistic scales is a general problem in
neural network research which has to be tackled in future work. As for the trial
numbers, the model reaches performance 0.5 (i.e. 75% correct actions) at around
90-100 time steps for the LR sequence (see Fig. 5.6) which corresponds to 45-50
trials. This is more realistic since it is o from real trial numbers by a factor of
1-3 only. Given that realistic anticipation rates are around 10-20%, i.e. far lower
than 75%, our model works with realistic trial numbers.
Another limitation concerns the type of input representation chosen in the model.
If the input units are to represent the human retina then eye-centred coordinates118 Development of visual expectations and sequence learning
would be more appropriate than the screen-centered ones chosen here. Speci-
cally, the position of the input on the retina should be dependent on the gaze
position. Successful learning would actually lead the input to stimulate the same
space on the retina while the gaze direction would change according to the input
sequence. This would complicate the model signicantly, though, by requiring a
transformation from eye-centered to head-centered coordinates. It is unclear if any
reasonable lessons about the development of visual expectations may be learned
from this eort.
In the context of real infant behavior it is important to ask about reactive sac-
cades. Even before any prediction about the sequence can be made, infants show
reactions to occurring stimuli by directing the gaze towards them. Specically,
their gaze behavior is far from random even in the beginning of the study in con-
trast to the model's behavior. In the context of the model it would be necessary
to use a sequence with stimuli displayed for at least two times steps and to make
the reinforcement learning architecture function faster than the reservoir learning
mechanisms. In that way, maximizing looking time in absence of the ability to
predict the sequence would lead to reactive saccades. This topic is indeed inter-
esting and may be combined with the extension of the model to larger time scales
in future.
Towards a model of enumeration
In Sect. 5.3 result 3) - the increase in probability to anticipate R after each presen-
tation of L - was explained parsimoniously by principle P4 already accounting for
other results. The explanation given was that for each L in the LLLR sequence the
minimal required memory (MRM) grows thereby making its prediction less prob-
able while making the opposite prediction (R) more likely. Note, that this account
does not require any enumeration model suggested in the literature. Particularly,
it is not a \number-based" explanation as put forward by Caneld and Smith
(1996). We believe that our model can suggest an alternative view of enumeration
in infancy and are excited to investigate this possibility in future work.119
Chapter 6
Discussion and outlook
This thesis was motivated by the following questions. How does infants' cogni-
tion get started? What are the building blocks of initial knowledge and how do
they develop? We decided to stay close to experimental data gathered in infant
psychology, tried to sketch what a theory of infant cognition may look like and
built computational models to test the plausibility of our ideas. We started by the
parsimonious assumption that all infants have at birth is the \blooming, buzzing
confusion" of light coming into the eye, the ability to move the eyes and some pow-
erful learning mechanisms. Throughout the thesis we adhered to these assumptions
while trying to conceive of how infant's rst knowledge may come about.
The three projects in this thesis covered in total a broad set of data from around
25 studies that used various experimental paradigms like habituation, visual pref-
erence and visual expectation. They capture dierent phenomena ranging from
the perception of causality, occlusion, object permanence, object tracking behind
occluders, object unity and sequence learning. Despite this diversity all three
projects embodied a common principle: the prediction of future events.
This principle suggests that what infants mainly do during cognitive development
is building internal models and representations of the world and using these mod-
els to predict how the world will behave. The errors that they make during this
process directly capture their attention and lead to further renement of the mod-
els. Interestingly, this procedure essentially re
ects the structure of scientic work.120 Discussion and outlook
The view that babies investigate the world basically in a scientic way is, of course,
not new and has been put forward by the developmental researcher Alison Gopnik
(see e.g. Gopnik et al. (1999)) as a research hypothesis on infant development.
In summary, the guiding principle of prediction and anticipation of future events
turned out to be very fruitful for the explanation of a broad range of data.
The rst project in chapter 2 modeled the development of causality and occlu-
sion perception since understanding that some objects move in a self-propelled
way while others are caused to move, looked like a promising path to get started
with the animate/inanimate distinction. This, in turn, could lead to the starting
point of global categories that the world is divided into. We did not arrive at the
latter goal since it seemed more important to understand even more basic princi-
ples like object unity more deeply.
The generality of the model formulation based on the prediction of future in-
puts made us conjecture that the general framework could allow for modelling
other event categories such as object unity. Indeed, a somewhat modied network
enabled modelling object unity while still accounting for occlusion and object per-
manence in chapter 3. Furthermore, there was nothing in principle that would
have prevented the model to be extended to capture studies on causality as well.
For example, additional units representing relative depth of objects would allow
the model to build representations of launching in their hidden layers.
At that moment, technical reasons prevented us from doing so: the object unity
network has become so large that learning became increasingly dicult. It was
already very dicult to account for so many dierent studies which required a lot
of twisting and tweaking and smart choices of the network parameters. In spite
of these technical diculties that re
ect the plague of the entire eld, it would
be short-sighted to assume that otherwise, we were on the right path. We be-
lieve that we were indeed on the right path but something important was wrong.
Specically, the diculties of extending the network to capture more phenomena
was only a symptom of the ineectiveness of the representations. In chapter 4 we
already discussed that a featurewise representation would make the network more
ecient and therefore easier to extend. This hits the heart of the problem: extend-121
ing the network by e.g. causality representations would mix the existing hidden
layer representations with the new ones. This certainly would destroy the existing
representations to some extent because they all would have to be processed by the
same hidden layers. This is a general problem in neural network research known
as the stability-plasticity dilemma (Grossberg, 1988). Extending the number of
neurons obviously only postpones the central problem: even if that works it would
require an over-proportional amount of tweaking and twisting in order to get the
network working. Intuitively, this kind of work will not pay o because there is
not much that we could expect to learn from that venture. In other words, the
network does not acquire independent representations that would constitute an
ecient strategy for further, open-ended learning. On the other hand, it seems
that infants indeed possess such representations as we concluded in chapter 4.
For these reasons it was necessary to look deeper into the question of where infants'
understanding of regularities and structures originates from and what guides learn-
ing in infancy. Therefore, in the third project we investigated sequence learning
and the formation of visual expectations. In a nutshell, the spike timing depen-
dent plasticity mechanism imprinted the structure of the sequence into the network
reservoir. The crucial question is whether this is really the process that happens
in the infant's brain. On the one hand, this mechanism is consistent with the
nding that infants use context-based representations of sequences (Lewkowicz
and Berent, 2009), i.e. infants seem to track statistical relations among specic
sequence elements (e.g. LR, RL) rather than using ordinal information (e.g. R is
third). On the other hand, it is necessary to study the microdevelopment of in-
fants' behavior and learning during the presentation of the sequence. For example,
Wentworth and Haith (1998) found that 2- and 3-month-olds require at least 10-20
alternations of the LR sequence in order to shift from repetitive saccades, i.e. eye
movements in the same direction as the previous one, in alternating saccades. This
may indicate a predisposition of infants to expect objects moving in a continuous
and linear fashion (on a small scale). In any case, this branch of research is barely
touched and creates an exciting opportunity to investigate how infants learn about
regularities in the environment and forecast future events. It will be interesting to
test the predictions of the model in collaboration with experimental groups.122 Discussion and outlook
It is remarkable that we started with the objective to nd the rst steps that
babies make on their way to understand the world and head on from there to later
stages of development. Contrary to that intention we found ourselves going back
in the age of infants asking rather how infants arrived at the modelled abilities
in the rst place. For example, modeling causality lead us to the conclusion that
perceiving one object launching another cannot be understood without being able
to segregate objects in the rst place. After modeling this object unity we found
ourselves being confronted with even more fundamental problems of how infants
generally extract regularities from the environment. Supercially, it looks like we
are stepping back in our progress but at a second glance it becomes clear that this
is the way scientic investigation takes place and it is beautiful because it takes
our understanding deeper and deeper toward the Big Bang of cognition.123
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Zusammenfassung der Arbeit
Dieses Kapitel beinhaltet eine deutsche Zusammenfassung der Arbeit. Bei Fach-
begrien, zu denen es keine deutschen Entsprechungen gibt, wurden die englischen
Bezeichnungen beibehalten.
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die Entwicklung fr uher kognitiver
F ahigkeiten im S auglingsalter mit neuronalen Netzen. Grundlegende Ereignisse in
der visuellen Wahrnehmung wie durch St oe verursachte Bewegung, Verdeckung,
Objektpermanenz, Verfolgen bewegter Objekte hinter Verdeckungen,
Wahrnehmung von Objekteinheit und das Erlernen von Reizfolgen werden in einem
vereinheitlichenden, theoretischen Rahmen modelliert, w ahrend die N ahe zu ex-
perimentellen Ergebnissen der Entwicklungspsychologie im S auglingsalter gewahrt
wird.
Entwicklung der Wahrnehmung von Kausalit at und
Verdeckung
Die Debatte um Kausalit at kann bis Hume (1740) zur uckverfolgt werden, in dessen
klassischer Abhandlung die Wahrnehmung von Kausalit at in einfachen
mechanischen Ereignissen das Resultat von wiederholter Wahrnehmung konstanter
Verkn upftheit zweier Ereignisse ist. Michotte (1963) argumentierte, dass Kausalit at
direkt
wahrgenommen werden k onne, w ahrend Leslie (1994) davon ausging, dass ein
angeborenes Kraft- oder Druckkonzept vonn oten sei. Mandler (2004) schlug vor,132 Zusammenfassung der Arbeit
dass die Betrachtung des  Ubertrags von Bewegung f ur Kinder eine ausreichende
Grundlage f ur eine fr uhe Interpretation kausaler physikalischer Ereignisse sei.
Ein anderes grundlegendes Verst andnis aus dem Bereich naiver Physik stellt die
Wahrnehmung von Verdeckung dar. Die Tatsache, dass Objekte, auch wenn sie
hinter einer Verdeckung verschwinden, weiterhin existieren | die sog. Objektper-
manenz | ist bei S auglingen nicht von Geburt an vorhanden, sondern entwickelt
sich um das Alter von vier Monaten herum (Baillargeon et al., 1985, Baillargeon,
1987). Auch das Nachverfolgen bewegter Objekte nach ihrer Verdeckung, d.h. ihre
fortgesetzte Repr asentation im Gehirn, ist eine F ahigkeit, die sich auch erst nach
einigen Monaten nach der Geburt entwickeln muss (Johnson et al., 2003, von Hof-
sten et al., 2007).
Die meisten bisherigen Experimente und Modelle untersuchen diese F ahigkeiten
nur getrennt voneinander, w ahrend ein vereinheitlichtes Modell noch ausblieb. Wir
pr asentieren ein k unstliches neuronales Netz, das zwei Experimente zur
Wahrnehmung von Kausalit at und Verdeckung in einem einheitlichen Rahmen
modelliert und erkl art. Es handelt sich um ein einfaches rekurrentes Netz, das
sog. Elman-Netz (Elman, 1990), das dazu trainiert wird, Reizabfolgen, die seiner
Eingabeschicht pr asentiert werden, vorherzusagen. Bei der Eingabe handelt es sich
um bewegte Pixel, die sich entweder linear bewegen, sich gegenseitig verdecken oder
stoen. Ein wichtiges, von uns in der Literatur zum ersten mal eingef uhrtes Ele-
ment, ist das Vortrainieren des Netzes, das je nach L ange des Trainings das Alter
des S auglings modelliert. Die Eingabereize bilden demnach die visuelle Erfahrung
des S auglings im Laufe des Lebens ab. Nach dem Vortraining wird das Netz ana-
log zu den tats achlich durchgef uhrten Experimenten wiederholt Verdeckungs- und
Stoabfolgen ausgesetzt. Der Backpropagation-Lernalgorithmus f uhrt dazu, dass
der Vorhersagefehler dieser Abfolgen kontinuierlich reduziert wird, analog zu den
gemessenen mittleren Betrachtungszeiten der S auglinge auf die ihnen gezeigten
Reize, wie es im sog. Habituationsparadigma beobachtet wird. Dieser Umstand
erlaubt die Modellierung von Blickzeiten mithilfe des Vorhersagefehlers des Net-
zes, zudem auch bei S auglingen davon ausgegangen wird, dass Vorhersagefehler
k unftiger Ereignisse f ur eine erh ohte Aufmerksamkeit und damit f ur ausgiebigere
Betrachtung der Reize verantwortlich sind (Vinogradova, 1975, Sokolov, 1963,133
1975, Gilmore and Thomas, 2002).
Das Netz erkl art die Wahrnehmung von Kausalit at und Verdeckung auf eine verein-
heitlichte Weise, in dem es beide Ph anomene auf den Umstand zur uckf uhrt, dass sie
durch das Erlernen von statistischen Regelm aigkeiten der Reizabfolgen repr asen-
tiert werden k onnen. Insbesondere konnte das Blickverhalten der S auglinge sowohl
bei den verschiedenen Reizen als auch im Verlauf ihrer Entwicklung dadurch de-
tailliert mithilfe desselben Netzes erkl art werden.
Entwicklung der Wahrnehmung von Objektein-
heit, Objektpermanenz und Verdeckung
Im zweiten Modell wird der erarbeitete theoretische Rahmen zu einem gr oeren
auf Vorhersage trainierten Netz erweitert, das die Entwicklung der Wahrnehmung
von Objekteinheit, Objektpermanenz und Verdeckung im S auglingsalter model-
liert. Das Verst andnis, dass die Welt aus Objekten besteht, deren Bestandteile
sich koh arent und auf stetigen Pfaden bewegen und die fortw ahrend existieren,
auch wenn sich verdeckt werden, ist ein wichtiger Schritt in unserer ontogenetischen
Entwicklung. Zum Beispiel hat die Erforschung der Wahrnehmung von Objektein-
heit gezeigt, dass vier Monate alte S auglinge in der Lage sind, einen sich hinter
einem Quader bewegenden Stab als vollst andig wahrzunehmen, obwohl lediglich
die beiden herausschauenden Stabenden sichtbar sind (Kellman and Spelke, 1983,
Johnson and Aslin, 1995, Johnson and N a~ nez, 1995).
Nebst Objekteinheit werden die Ph anomene der Verdeckung und Objektperma-
nenz aus dem vorherigen Kapitel aufgegrien. Es wird gezeigt, dass diese ver-
schiedenen modellierten Ph anomene in einem einzigen theoretischen Rahmen vere-
inheitlicht werden k onnen und damit experimentelle Ergebnisse aus 14 S auglingsstu-
dien erkl art werden k onnen. Die Modelle demonstrieren, dass diese Entwick-
lungsph anomene erkl art werden k onnen, indem statistische Regelm aigkeiten in
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nehmen an, dass (1) verschiedene neuronale Populationen im visuellen Kortex
des neugeborenen S auglings auch verschiedene Bewegungsrichtungen der visuellen
Reize verarbeiten, was durch neurowissenschaftliche Belege untermauert ist (Or-
ban et al., 1986), und (2) Lernmechanismen vorhanden sind, die zur Vorhersage
k unftiger Ereignisse f uhren. Insbesondere demonstrieren die Modelle, dass keine
angeborenen Kraftkonzepte, Module zur Bewegungsanalyse (Leslie, 1994), Detek-
toren korrelierter Bewegung (Mareschal and Johnson, 2002), besondere
Wahrnehmungsregeln oder die F ahigkeit  uber Entit aten \nachzudenken" (Spelke,
1994), wie sie weitverbreitet in der Literatur der Entwicklungspsychologie zu nden
sind, notwendig sind, um die diskutierten Ph anomene zu erkl aren.
Entwicklung visueller Erwartungen und das Er-
lernen von Reizabfolgen
Da sich die Vorhersage k unftiger Ereignisse f ur die theoretische Erkl arung diverser
Entwicklungsph anomene und als Leitfaden f ur das Lernen im S auglingsalter als
fruchtbar erwiesen hat, spricht das dritte Modell die Entwicklung visueller Er-
wartungen selbst an. Eine Reihe von Studien haben gezeigt, dass selbst wenige
Monate alte S auglinge in der Lage sind, Abfolgen von links und rechts auf dem
Bildschirm auftauchenden Bildern durch antizipatorische Augenbewegungen
vorherzusagen (Haith et al., 1988, Caneld et al., 1997, Wentworth and Haith,
1998, Jacobson et al., 1992, Caneld and Haith, 1991, Caneld and Smith, 1996,
Rose et al., 2002, Reznick et al., 2000). Auerdem wurde in den genannten Studien
u.a. ein Abfall der Reaktionszeiten im Laufe der Experimente und mit steigendem
Alter der S auglinge beobachtet.
Ein selbstorganisierendes, vollst andig rekurrentes, neuronales Netz, das interne
Repr asentationen von Eingabeabfolgen formt und sie auf Augenbewegungen ab-
bildet, wird vorgeschlagen, um den obigen Datensatz zu modellieren. Die f ur das
Verst arkungslernen verantwortliche Architektur des Modells lernt, antizipatorische
Augenbewegungen verschiedener Reizabfolgen auszuf uhren. Das Modell postuliert,135
dass das Blickverhalten von S auglingen vom Ziel, die Betrachtungszeit interessan-
ter Reize zu maximieren, geleitet ist, und erkl art damit das Auftauchen und die En-
twicklung antizipatorischer Augenbewegungen und Reaktionszeiten. Im Gegensatz
zu herk ommlichen Modellen mit neuronalen Netzen in der Entwicklungspsycholo-
gie benutzt das Modell lokale Lernregeln und enth alt mehrere biologisch plausible
Elemente wie exzitatorische und inhibitorische Neuronen, spike-timing dependent
plasticity (STDP), intrinsische Plastizit at (IP) und synaptische Skalierung. Es
bedient sich eines dynamischen, rekurrenten Reservoirs, das sich nachweislich f ur
Vorhersageaufgaben gut eignet und herk ommliche Netze mit statischem Reservoir
in ihrer Leistung  ubersteigt (Lazar et al., 2009). Wir erweitern dieses Reservoir
mit einer Architektur f ur das Verst arkunglernen, womit das Modell auch aus tech-
nischer Sicht neuartig ist.
Das gesamte Netz erlernt die Reizabfolgen, z.B. eine links-links-rechts Folge, in-
dem es diese Abfolge der Eingabeneuronaktivit aten nichtlinear auf die Aktivit at
des gesamten Reservoirs abbildet und damit in einen hochdimensionalen Reser-
voirzusandsraum projiziert. Die damit erreichte sog. lineare Trennbarkeit der
Reservoirzust ande bildet die Basis f ur das Auslesen der Zust ande mithilfe der Ar-
chitektur f ur das Verst arkungslernen. Dieses aus dem sog. reservoir computing
abgeleitete Prinzip wird nun durch neuronale Plastizit at des Reservoirs erweitert,
das noch bessere Repr asentationen der Eingabefolgen erreicht und eine Grundlage
f ur die Modellierung verschiedener Altersstufen bildet. Eine Analyse der Wechsel-
wirkung zwischen dem Reservoir und dem Verst arkungslernen ergibt einen nicht-
trivialen, dynamischen Zusammenhang, der in der Analyse untersucht wird.
Das Modell erkl art zw olf experimentelle Studien und sagt unter anderem das
Antizipationsverhalten von S auglingen f ur beliebige Reizabfolgen und den erle-
ichterten Wiedererwerb bereits erlernter Abfolgen vorher. Durch die F ahigkeit
selbst identische, wiederholte Eingaben auf verschiedene Reservoirzust ande abzu-
bilden, wird es dem Modell m oglich, identische Eingabefolgen abzuz ahlen, was als
Grundlage f ur die Erkl arung der Entwicklung numerischer und mathematischer
F ahigkeiten bei S auglingen dienen kann.136 Zusammenfassung der Arbeit
Alle Modelle betonen die Entwicklung der Wahrnehmung der diskutierten
Ph anomene und erkl aren, wie und warum Ver anderung w ahrend der Entwick-
lung stattndet | Fragen, die auf experimentelle Weise schwierig zu kl aren sind.
Trotz der Verschiedenheit der diskutierten Ph anomene beruhen alle drei Projekte
auf dem selben Prinzip: die Vorhersage k unftiger Ereignisse. Dieses Prinzip pos-
tuliert, dass die kognitive Entwicklung im S auglingsalter zu groen Teilen vom
Aufbau interner Modelle und Repr asentationen der visuellen Umgebung und vom
Benutzen dieser Modelle zur Vorhersage der k unftigen Entwicklung dieser Umge-
bung geleitet ist.137
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